

CA1  
Z1  
-1988  
T002  
v. 5

GOVT







Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2023 with funding from  
University of Toronto

<https://archive.org/details/39091118030109>

CAI  
Z 1  
-1988  
TOOD  
V.K

18



Government  
Publications

Royal Commission on the Future  
of the Toronto Waterfront

# Jobs, Opportunities and Economic Growth

5

Royal Commission on the  
Future of the  
Toronto Waterfront



CANADA


Commission royale sur  
l'avenir du  
secteur riverain de Toronto

*With Compliments*

*The Honourable David Crombie, P.C.  
Commissioner*

(18)

CA 1  
Z 1  
- 1988  
T002  
V15



Royal Commission on the  
Future of the  
Toronto Waterfront



Commission royale sur  
l'avenir du  
secteur riverain de Toronto

Commissioner  
The Honourable David Crombie, P.C.

Executive Director and Counsel  
Ronald L. Doering

Administrator  
Mary Ann Allen

Commissaire  
L'honorable David Crombie, c.p.

Directeur exécutif et Conseiller juridique  
Ronald L. Doering

Administratrice  
Mary Ann Allen

Dear Colleague:

I am pleased to provide a copy of the Report made to me by the Jobs, Opportunities and Economic Growth Work Group of the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront.

It represents the opinion of the authors and not of the Commission. Clearly, however, it deals with a subject of utmost importance facing this Commission and all those who want a better waterfront for Toronto.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Cher collègue,

Je suis heureux de vous transmettre un exemplaire du rapport que m'a remis le groupe de travail sur les emplois, les perspectives et la croissance économique de la Commission royale sur l'avenir du secteur riverain de Toronto.

Ce rapport représente l'opinion de ses auteurs et n'engage pas la Commission. De toute évidence, toutefois, il concerne un sujet d'une très haute importance pour la Commission et pour tous ceux qui souhaitent que le secteur riverain de Toronto soit plus accueillant.

En espérant recevoir bientôt de vos nouvelles, je vous prie d'agréer, cher collègue, mes cordiales salutations.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "David Crombie".

David Crombie

171 rue Sister St, 11th Floor, 11<sup>e</sup> étage  
P.O. Box/C.P. 1527  
Station/Succursale 'B'  
Ottawa, Canada K1P 6P5

Tel No./No. de téléphone: (613) 990-3306  
Fax No./No. de facsimilé: (613) 990-4345

207 Queen's Quay West/Ouest, 5th Floor/5<sup>e</sup> étage  
P.O. Box/C.P. 4111  
Station/Succursale 'A'  
Toronto, Canada M5W 2V4

Tel No./No. de téléphone: (416) 973-7185  
Fax No./No. de facsimilé: (416) 973-7103



# **Jobs, Opportunities and Economic Growth**

Report of the  
**Jobs, Opportunities, and Economic Growth Work Group**  
to the  
**Royal Commission**  
**on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront**

*Frontispiece*

*In 1954, Number One Yonge Street was the home of the Toronto Star's rotogravure section, a rotary press for printing the weekly and daily paper.*

Photo courtesy of *The Toronto Star*, June 5, 1954; illustration by George Paginton, photo research: William Rosart.

© Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1989  
Cat. No. Z1-1988/1-41-5E  
ISBN 0-662-16939-5

# ***Table of Contents***

<b><i>Members of the Work Group</i></b> .....	3
<b><i>Preface</i></b> .....	5
<b><i>Acknowledgements</i></b> .....	7
<b><i>Summary</i></b> .....	9
<b><i>1. Introduction</i></b> .....	15
<b><i>2. Historical Background</i></b> .....	19
<b><i>3. Economic Context of Toronto's Waterfront</i></b> .....	27
De-industrialization of Toronto's Economy .....	27
Employment Trends in the Toronto Area and on the Waterfront.....	30
Tourism in Toronto .....	39
<b><i>4. Current Plans: Issues and Opportunities</i></b> .....	41
1. The Etobicoke Waterfront .....	41
2. Exhibition Place and Ontario Place .....	46
3. Toronto Island Airport.....	51
4. Railway Lands.....	58
5. Harbourfront .....	63
6. Central Bayfront .....	69
7. East Bayfront .....	73
8. Port Industrial District.....	84
9. Port of Toronto .....	98
10. Leslie Street Spit.....	110
11. Greenwood Racetrack Area.....	113
12. The Scarborough Waterfront.....	114
13. Other Initiatives.....	115
13.1 Olympic Games .....	115
13.2 World's Fair 2000 .....	118
<b><i>5. Revitalizing the Waterfront Economy</i></b> .....	121
<b><i>Bibliography</i></b> .....	125

## ***Maps***

- 1. Metropolitan Toronto Waterfront: Definition  
Used for the Collection of Employment Data**
- 2. Areas of Major Economic Opportunity on  
Toronto's Waterfront**
- 3. The Etobicoke Waterfront**
- 4. Exhibition Place and Ontario Place**
- 5. Toronto Island Airport**
- 6. Harbourfront Lands**
- 7. Toronto's Central Waterfront**
- 8. Toronto's East Bayfront**
- 9. Toronto's Port Industrial District**
- 10. Toronto Harbour Commissioners'  
Port Industrial Area Concept Plan**
- 11. The Scarborough Waterfront**

# **Members of the Work Group**

## **James K. Perkins (*Chair*)**

**J**im Perkins is the principal of Public Management Associates, which specialises in public finance and public and economic policy issues. He holds B.A. and M.P.A. degrees from the University of Michigan. He served as Budget Director for the City of Toronto, City Administrator of St. John, N.B. and as Finance Commissioner/Treasurer of the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, before establishing his consulting practice.

## **Gene Desfor**

Gene Desfor is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University. He teaches urban development processes, and focuses his research on Toronto's changing waterfront. His recent publications include analyses of Toronto's current waterfront developments and of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners' 1912 Waterfront Plan.

## **David F. Larone**

David Larone is a partner in Pannell, Kerr, Forster, Management Consultants, which conducts market and economic feasibility studies and evaluates projects in the tourist and hospitality industry.

## **Michael Lyons**

Michael Lyons is the President of Impact Labour Representatives & Consultants. He is the immediate past president of the Labour Council of Metro Toronto. For the past 23 years he has been a well known activist and spokesperson for the labour movement. Mr. Lyons' career has also included a very active presence in the political arena, especially municipal politics. He has served on a number of community boards and agencies dealing with jobs, economic development, housing, public education transportation, social & community services, race relations and the arts.



## **James Shears**

In 1985, Jim Shears joined the Toronto Harbour Commissioners as Assistant Director, Property Administration, responsible for the administration and management of Port lands, landholding marketing and development. Previously, he was a researcher in the Planning and Urban Affairs Department of the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Toronto and a business development officer for the City of Cambridge, Ontario.



# Preface

The Jobs, Opportunities, and Economic Growth Work Group was one of five groups established by the Intergovernmental Waterfront Committee in September 1988 to explore issues related to the mandate of the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront. The other four groups were Environment and Health; Housing and Neighbourhoods; Access and Movement; and Parks, Pleasures, and Public Amenities.

The task of each group was to: summarize current plans and initiatives in the relevant field; examine the issues that all levels of government must address if the Toronto waterfront is to achieve its highest potential; and identify new opportunities that could be pursued if there were greater co-ordination amongst all governments and public authorities.

Gene Desfor, David F. Larone, Michael Lyons, James Perkins  
*(Chairperson)*, James Shears

Toronto, June 1989





# Acknowledgements

The Jobs, Opportunities and Economic Growth Work Group thanks Beverly Morley for her encouragement and participation. Thanks also to Jeanette Niggenaber, of Pannell, Kerr, Forster Management Consultants, whose assistance in preparing the report was invaluable. We also wish to acknowledge the contribution of Ben DiRamo, Susan Himmel, and Cairine Oulton, of York University's Faculty of Environmental Studies, who were our graduate student assistants.





# **Summary**

The Jobs, Opportunities, and Economic Growth Work Group recommends a working waterfront for Metropolitan Toronto. This recommendation derives from our belief that the waterfront should be the working edge of the urban area.

The waterfront is a special and magical place, but it should also be home to a set of mixed economic activities, a range of housing types, a variety of recreational opportunities, and a diverse and healthy environment. The concept of a working waterfront reflects our desire to see a waterfront that contains an appropriate mix of land uses, a scale of development compatible with human activity and accessible to the public; the waterfront and adjacent areas should be a place for people to live, work, and visit — people of diverse incomes and interests — and a place in which current industrial uses continue and new ones are established. Many issues, however, must be resolved before redevelopment achieves that kind of waterfront for Toronto.

The goal of this Report is to promote informed public discussion about issues surrounding the redevelopment of Toronto's waterfront. To begin, we identify four principles that helped us determine the direction of future uses of the waterfront.

- First, the waterfront is an area with unique and wonderful — yet fragile — qualities.
- Second, the waterfront should be retained in public ownership so that it can be enjoyed by future, as well as present, generations.
- Third, the waterfront should be readily accessible to all members of the public.
- Fourth, redevelopment on the waterfront should be guided by public and environmental priorities, even if these preclude or reduce commercial, retail, industrial, and residential uses.

The Work Group divided the waterfront into twelve geographical areas. The plans for each area were examined, and the major issues and redevelopment opportunities related to the plans were identified.



We worked west to east, beginning in Etobicoke, which is currently in the midst of planning for massive waterfront redevelopment. In the last few years, the Etobicoke waterfront has lost a significant number of industrial jobs — more than 3,700 between 1981 and 1986.

Two areas, the Lakeshore Psychiatric Hospital site and the Motel Strip, are the focus of redevelopment initiatives. The Lakeshore Psychiatric site is particularly desirable, but redevelopment must await resolution of disagreements in the community about the future of the site.

Plans to redevelop the Motel Strip emphasize condominium residential, retail, office, and hotel uses. A recent provincial decision allows the plan to proceed without a full environmental assessment.

Future plans for Exhibition and Ontario Place depend largely on Toronto's success in attracting the 1996 Olympic Games and World Fair 2000, both of which would stage events at Exhibition Place. Whatever the outcome of these proposals, the Work Group recommends that a wider variety of uses be permitted, including construction of an international trade centre. Means should be found to enhance the working relations between Exhibition Place and Ontario Place, in order to improve the co-ordination of cultural, recreational, and leisure activities.

A number of dramatically different plans have been proposed for the Toronto Island Airport (TIA). On one hand, there are suggestions that an expanded airport be located on the Leslie Street Spit or on new lands created south of the Toronto Islands. On the other hand, there are plans to eliminate the Airport entirely. The Work Group acknowledges the importance of the TIA to the Toronto community, and urges that it remain at its current location.

A majority of the Work Group supports the Railway Lands plan for commercial office space and housing, but is concerned that parking and vehicular access will be inadequate and therefore there will be an over-reliance on public transit. We identified a significant opportunity, in conjunction with the Railway Lands, to construct an intermodal transportation facility for rail, the TTC, Go Transit, Via Rail, and the inter-city bus carriers at Union Station. It should use the Canada Post lands to the south, and it should be established in association with the private sector.



The redevelopment of Harbourfront lands proceeded swiftly following the acceptance, in 1980, of a Master Agreement between the City of Toronto and Harbourfront Corporation. Recently, however, Harbourfront's plans have been stalled by three reviews of its development projects. The most obvious concern was that several tall and narrow condominium buildings appeared to violate reasonable design standards and were viewed as ugly. We found that Harbourfront's objective of being financially self-sufficient, a basic principle of the 1978 *Development Framework*, resulted in the company's Board of Directors focusing more on achieving corporate goals than on responding to public responsibilities. We support continued development of Harbourfront land in accord with a revised urban design plan.

The potential for redevelopment of the Central Bayfront was recognized in 1962 when the Toronto Star purchased land at the foot of Yonge Street for its head office and newspaper production facilities. Most of the Central Bayfront has now been developed, as critics have noted, with a wall of concrete high-rise towers. Two related issues of major importance were identified by the Work Group. First, Toronto's business district expanded southward without reference to any comprehensive plan. Second, most of the development in the Central Bayfront was achieved by selling publicly owned waterfront land to the private sector.

The East Bayfront lies between high-density commercial and residential development to the west and the Port industrial lands to the east. As such, there is pressure to redevelop the land for residential and commercial uses in this traditionally industrial area. The Group is of the opinion that the East Bayfront should be retained for industrial activity, and that proposals to introduce housing into the area should be rejected. Rather, policies that encourage investment and reinvestment in appropriate industry should be promoted and implemented.

The Port Industrial District is about 370 hectares (917 acres) of land created from lakefill by the Toronto Harbour Commissioners as the centrepiece of its visionary 1912 Waterfront Development Plan. Since then, it has been the site of heavy and light industry and of many Port facilities. There is no lack of plans for redevelopment of the site: the Toronto Ontario Olympic Council would like to use it for many Olympic



facilities. *Bold Concept II* suggests a harbour village with resort and leisure activity. The City of Toronto's Official Plan encourages redevelopment for cleaner, more contemporary and environmentally sound industrial uses. Some City politicians and provincial officials would like to see housing in the area. The Toronto Harbour Commissioners' recently announced Concept Plan for the area is intended to provide for current and future needs of Port users, to strengthen public access to the area, and to promote economic development.

After reviewing these plans, the Work Group concludes that the Port Industrial District should be used for industrial activity and that housing should not be developed there. In addition to retaining existing plants, new and appropriate industry should be attracted to the area; we identified opportunities for a comprehensively planned film-production and theatre-arts centre, innovative construction-related industries, and industrial business parks.

Toronto's Port is administered by an organization unique in the system of Canadian ports and harbours: the Toronto Harbour Commissioners is a federally legislated corporation charged with developing, managing, and maintaining the harbour and property under its jurisdiction. The majority of the five members on the board of this quasi-governmental corporation are appointed by Toronto's City Council.

The Work Group found that, as with the Toronto Island Airport (also under the management of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners), both defenders and those antagonistic to the Port have strongly held positions. Those who believe that Toronto does not need a port point to the decline in shipments as evidence, while port supporters argue that Toronto needs a variety of transportation modes, and that many water-dependent and water-related industries could not exist without the Port. We were reminded of the 1925 statement by Edward L. Cousins, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners' first Chief Engineer, that the benefits from Port improvements were intended to result not so much from "harbour dues or revenue from Great Lakes tonnage as from the general benefit that would accrue to the City". The Work Group believes the Port is vital and recommends adoption of policies that will enhance its presence. Opportunities exist for a government marine repair and maintenance facility, a recreational boating repair and maintenance facility, and an increased use of the Port for bringing in construction related materials.



The Leslie Street Spit has attracted considerable discussion recently. The Spit comprises about 121 hectares (300 acres) of land and 101 hectares (250 acres) of embayments and lagoons. It was originally intended as a breakwater to protect a new Outer Harbour, but has evolved into a natural urban park with Environmentally Significant Areas. Plans to develop the Spit for capital-intensive recreation, airport or commercial uses have been proposed for more than 15 years. The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (MTRCA) has recently adopted a plan that divides the Spit into a managed natural area and a zone for general recreation, including sailing clubs, an interpretative centre, and parking. Before the plan is approved, it will, in all likelihood, have to undergo a full provincial environmental assessment. The majority of the Work Group supports the MTRCA plan.

Our report includes four recommendations that relate to general processes of waterfront development.

- First, the waterfront should be understood as being part of broad economic, political, and ecological systems, all of which have important regional dimensions.
- Second, waterfront planning and control should not be fragmented among autonomous, semi-autonomous, and special-purpose agencies, each of which operates with a distinct vision for the waterfront.
- Third, individual and social costs associated with a rapidly changing economy should be identified clearly and programs to deal with problems arising from these costs should be established.
- Fourth, budgeting, accounting, financial, and analytical tools should be improved to identify and measure social change, particularly as it relates to the waterfront.

The Work Group also identified a number of policy initiatives that might be used to encourage industries to remain or relocate on the waterfront. These include: legislation to permit property tax relief and to establish tax relief zones; innovative land ownership arrangements; zoning by-laws that permit a greater mix of activities, including industrial, commercial, and residential uses; and greater use of 'cross-subsidization' to support the retention of existing industry.





# 1. Introduction

**A**t the beginning of the 20th century, industrial production propelled growth in Toronto's economy. The waterfront reflected this expanding industrial economy with its port and water-related manufacturing and with its many sets of grade-level railway tracks. In the last two or three decades, however, ongoing changes have dramatically transformed Toronto's economy so that now it is largely dominated by business, personal, and information services.

During this time, there have also been dramatic changes on the waterfront: shipping has declined sharply from its peak in the late 1960s and manufacturing plants have relocated or closed down. Waterfront plant closures show an unmistakable pattern: between 1981 and 1987 more than 1,000 manufacturing jobs on the waterfront have been lost *each year*. In contrast to the decline in manufacturing, service sector employment on the waterfront rose in the same period: each year jobs in the office sector increased by more than 1,000 and by almost 1,000 in retail and personal services. These changes in the waterfront economy reflect the same kind of restructuring that has taken place throughout the rest of Toronto.

In looking at the issues and opportunities for economic growth on the waterfront, the Work Group confronted the reality of Toronto's restructured economy. We struggled with the notion of a post-industrial economy to determine its relevance to the waterfront in particular, and to the Toronto region more generally. By the end of our investigations and deliberations, and despite the trends of the recent past, we concluded that a strong presence of high value-producing industry on the waterfront was essential. The waterfront has the only large tracts of land still available for industry in the city, and a healthy, stable economy able to generate a variety of well-paying employment opportunities requires a solid industrial base. We concur with the opinion expressed by Northern Telecom president, David Vice:

The idea that we entered a 'post-industrial' economy, where services have replaced manufacturing as the engine of growth and opportunity [is] wrong....The reasons are clear and simple...the service sector is a complement to manufacturing not a substitute or successor. Lose manufacturing and we will lose service jobs, not develop them.<sup>1</sup>

1. Manfred Bienefeld, "Canadian Industry and the Free Trade Agreement", Mel Watkins (ed), *Alternatives To The Free Trade Agreement*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, October 1988.



We have subtitled this report "A Working Waterfront" as an indication of our overall view that the waterfront should be the working edge of the city with economically diverse activities; that it should be publicly accessible and supportive of public cultural, recreational, social, and economic needs. A working waterfront, drawing on both traditional strengths and new opportunities to maintain and enhance the working elements of the waterfront, would engender increased awareness of that special area of Metro where land and lake meet. The result would be a dynamic area with a mix of land uses, including industry, that would continue to be attractive as a site for both housing and open spaces.

While some definitions of a working waterfront are confined to only those sections where such marine-oriented activities as fishing, boat repair, and marine supplies are carried on, we use the term more broadly, to cover all appropriate locations on the water's edge.

In this report, the Toronto waterfront is defined as the area from Etobicoke Creek on the west to the Rouge River on the east, north from the edge of Lake Ontario to the first significant transportation corridor; the exception is in the central area, where the term includes the Railway Lands and adjacent area.

In structuring our report, we present our recommendations, as well as the analyses and information on which we have based them. In doing so, we summarize current plans for different areas and highlight the issues related to jobs, opportunities, and economic growth that require the attention of the various levels of government.

We also identify new opportunities that arise from the issues we have examined, assuming, of course, that there will be a high degree of cooperation among the various waterfront agencies and levels of government involved.

Our mandate specifically gave us responsibility for:

- collecting information on plans and considering their consequences for the economy of the Toronto area in general and the waterfront in particular;
- identifying issues and conflicts arising from these plans, and where possible, noting places where different plans were based on common concerns and attitudes toward the waterfront; and



- identifying opportunities for new initiatives that would encourage jobs and economic growth on the waterfront.

The waterfront cannot and should not be viewed in isolation from broader economic, environmental, and social issues. Thus, we have endeavoured to identify broad historical and economic trends that led to changes in the character and uses of the waterfront.

We recognize, and our analysis considered, the many competing interests for varied and limited waterfront resources. Consideration of competing interests inevitably requires trade-offs, which we have tried to identify both generally and in relation to each issue. We did not attempt to reach conclusions on these points, but left options for others to choose.

Views within the Work Group were not always unanimous and there were sometimes differing interpretations of issues. Where serious dissent occurred, it is noted in the body of the Report.

In this Report, we speak frequently about 'second-generation industry'. This type of enterprise, which is the focus of industrial development strategies of the provincial and municipal governments in Metro, is defined as an industrial activity in which a high per-employee value is added in the production process. Such industries frequently require workers with new skills, and retraining is often necessary for those previously engaged in more traditional industrial occupations. Among such second-generation industries are electronics, communications, laser technology, development of computer hardware or software, research and development, fashion, medical equipment and technology, bio-engineering, and printing and publishing.

Finally, we urge readers of this Report to remember that it is, more than anything, about people — people working, living, walking, swimming, sailing, fishing, observing nature, and simply enjoying the richness of the waterfront. In some places, we use abstract terms, such as capitalization or value-added, and sometimes we have analysed the merits of investment in concrete and steel buildings; at still other times, we have had to use economic or technical language to accurately describe a variety of individual and social welfare concepts. However, this short-hand language should not be misunderstood: our fundamental concern throughout all of our research and deliberations was, and is, people.





## *2. Historical Background*<sup>2</sup>

A new approach for the redevelopment of Toronto's waterfront was established in 1911 by the Government of Canada when it adopted legislation creating the Toronto Harbour Commissioners (THC). The ownership and control of virtually the entire Toronto waterfront was concentrated in the hands of this new body, which was empowered to develop the lands, not merely as a port, but especially for industrial and commercial uses. Given its broad powers to control land, the harbour commission was much more than the operating body signified by its name, and quickly began to function as a land development agency.

With the establishment of the THC, ownership of Toronto's waterfront was intended to remain under the control of a public authority. During the two or three decades preceding the formation of the THC, the City of Toronto had entertained a number of waterfront development schemes proposed by private-sector syndicates. According to the plans of two of the most prominent of them, large portions of the waterfront would have come under the control of the private sector.

These schemes never became a reality — not because the City decided the collective interests of the community would be better served by maintaining the waterfront under public ownership, but because one of the syndicates seems to have mysteriously vanished or perhaps never existed other than on paper. The other one lost interest and backed out of the deal, even though provincial approval to incorporate had been secured, when the City insisted the syndicate clean up fouled waters as part of the development agreement. The syndicate feared this somewhat undefined and potentially expensive requirement would jeopardize the profitability of the scheme. The syndicate's solicitor wrote, "Any money spent in opening channels, disinfecting sewers, etc. is so much money thrown away as far as the objectives of the Company are concerned" [City of Toronto, Minutes of the Corporation of the City of Toronto, minute no. 933, 1892].

After the private syndicate fiasco, and in an act of desperation, the City adopted its own development plan (which became known as the Keating Plan, named for the City Engineer who devised it). According to this scheme, the City would maintain

2. This section closely follows Gene Desfor, Michael Goldrick, and Roy Merrens, "A Political Economy of the Waterfrontier: Planning and Development in Toronto", *Geoforum*, forthcoming 1989.





*Goodeham & Worts Ltd., one of the waterfront's earliest industries, still continues to bring in raw material for its distillery.*

Photo courtesy of City of Toronto Archives, SC 583-74.

ownership of the waterfront and gradually undertake its own scheme for development. In this way, it hoped to avoid legal action from various groups concerned about unhealthy conditions in Ashbridge's Bay. By the first decade of the 20th century, public ownership of the waterfront had become established policy. City Council and the Toronto Board of Trade (the most effectively organized of the private-sector groups) came to an agreement with the Government of Canada: public ownership of the waterfront should be maintained under the management of an independent special-purpose commission, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners published a comprehensive plan in 1912, which was approved without delay by the local and federal governments. The major project within the plan was the reclamation of about 405 hectares (1,000 acres) of marshland in the eastern section of the waterfront. These lands, which were to become known as the Port Industrial District, were to be used primarily for industrial activity, but were to include port-related facilities, railways, storage, and parklands.

The THC's remarkable 1912 plan guided the reshaping and redevelopment of Toronto's waterfront and, by the 1940s, its objectives had been largely achieved. Despite two major sales of land for industrial activity in 1949, the wave of waterfront redevelopment inaugurated by the initial scheme was spent by the end of the 1940s.

By the late 1950s, redevelopment initiatives were being put forward: the THC was preparing for the shipping that would arrive as the result of the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959. The new expressway to the sea was expected to make North American and European seaports more accessible to Toronto, thereby increasing shipping to and from its Port. The City, the Metro Toronto government, and the private sector began to perceive that there was value in redeveloping the waterfront.

In 1959, the City adopted a report suggesting it begin planning for the waterfront. In 1961, Metro Toronto recommended formation of a committee that would bring forward a comprehensive plan for 80 kilometres of waterfront. The complexity of such an undertaking soon became apparent and, in 1962, Metro found it necessary to establish two waterfront committees: a Waterfront Advisory Committee and a Waterfront Technical



Committee. Each had a large membership and a complicated organization of numerous subcommittees. In total, 28 groups were represented on the Advisory Committee and 14 on the Technical Committee. This multiplicity of interests contrasted sharply with the City's earlier approach to waterfront development, when planning and development were united under the authority of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners.

The private sector was also taking initiatives to redevelop the waterfront: in 1962, the Toronto Star purchased land at the foot of Yonge Street as the site of its head office. In the same year, Canada Steamship Lines announced that it was moving its operations out of the City and that Marvo Construction Co. had agreed to purchase its site for commercial and residential redevelopment. These initiatives are evidence that business interests believed non-industrial activities could be profitable on the waterfront.

By the end of 1967, after almost six years of work, the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board produced its plan for the entire waterfront. The plan for the central section, titled *Bold Concept*, was produced by the Toronto Harbour Commissioners and was as ambitious and grandiose as that of the 1912 plan; but its key elements were hotly disputed and it met with a very different fate: *Bold Concept* was never accepted. Each of the projects within the plan was very controversial (e.g., relocating the Island Airport and establishing a Harbour City community of 50,000 people), and there was insufficient political support to see it through the difficulties it would have encountered. Moreover, there was no 'market' of the kind that now exists for waterfront property, and redevelopment would have been an unacceptably risky business.

Despite those difficulties, by 1967 the potential for redeveloping waterfront properties seems to have been understood. That year, the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific railways announced plans for a joint venture for massive redevelopment of their prime Central Waterfront lands in a project called Metro Centre. In 1969, the Campeau Corporation purchased development rights from the floundering Marvo Corporation for construction of Harbour Square. These two schemes dramatize the transitional nature of the waterfront lands by indicating the feasibility of major new investment opportunities there.



The two projects were also consistent with Toronto's 1969 Central Area Plan, which was essentially an aggressive effort to promote more commercial development in the central city and provide accommodation for the anticipated influx of middle- and upper-middle-income residents. The Ontario Municipal Board, however, ruled that any large projects like Metro Centre or Harbour Square could be dealt with by City Council only after 'public objectives' for the waterfront were clearly defined.

This ruling set in motion a process that eventually led to the City's formation of the Central Waterfront Planning Committee and the Central Waterfront Technical Committee. These committees undertook an extraordinarily complex, elaborate, and exacting planning process which, not surprisingly, became both time-consuming and cumbersome. The nature of the planning process and external demands made on it severely delayed its completion.

In effect, the City's planning staff had been shunted off to work on a long-term development plan, while large projects were being bypassed or given preferential treatment in the usual planning process; the result was that the planning staff was forced to modify its schemes according to the *de facto* reality of private-sector developers. Redevelopment was occurring on an *ad hoc* basis with no comprehensive policy to guide it.

(It would take until the summer of 1988, some 14 years after the establishment of the two waterfront planning committees by City Council, for a Central Waterfront plan to be approved.)

The need for a plan reflected fundamental economic changes that were occurring in the Toronto area, as well as around the world. Since the end of the Second World War, the Toronto region had grown substantially in population and economic activity. By the 1950s, two facets of this growth had become evident: the rapid suburbanization of population and employment, and the declining importance, within the central City, of primary and secondary industry and associated rail and water transportation.

Both tendencies seemed to challenge the traditional dominance of the City of Toronto in the Metropolitan region. City politicians were alarmed, and eventually they adopted the 1969 version of the Official Plan, which was intended to restore the dominance of Toronto's Central Area within the region.



The centralization strategies in this plan, which would have resulted in expansion of the urban core into the surrounding residential neighbourhoods, had unanticipated political consequences. In 1972, a voter revolt, led by residents and ratepayers in the middle-class neighbourhoods that would have been threatened by an enlarged Central Area, replaced many old-guard City aldermen with reform-minded Council members and elected a reform-minded mayor.

The reform Council oversaw the formulation of a new Official Plan for the Central Area, which was adopted in 1978. It envisioned economic growth, particularly commercial activity, that would be accommodated by further intensification within the core area, and dispersal strategies that would redirect excess growth to regional sub-centres.

The Official Plan recognized that there would be strong pressure from an expanding economy to make room for new commercial, institutional, and residential activity. The reform Council intended to protect residential neighbourhoods surrounding the Central Area from intensification and adjoining industrial areas from commercial encroachment and institutional expansion.

By intensifying land use within the existing Central Area, some of the demand created by the expanding economic activity could be satisfied. Other development, requiring more transportation facilities than the system contained, would be directed to suburban sub-centres. Although the Central Area plan dealt only with downtown Toronto, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was reviewing its official plan, which also recognized the sub-centre concept.

Toronto's 1978 Official Plan had the effect of opening development possibilities in the one place in the Central Area without any neighbourhoods and organized interest groups: the waterfront. At least initially, the Plan largely ignored the redevelopment potential of this vast tract; with minor modifications, the existing industrial designation of the waterfront lands was simply reaffirmed.

But far-reaching structural change was under way in the City and would soon alter these land uses. Alterations in the economic structure of the Toronto region reflected the continuation of a long-term trend toward concentrating information-based services in the core area. In 1981, trade,



finance, insurance, real estate, community, business and personal services employed two-thirds of the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area labour force.

Relocation of corporate headquarters to the central City has concentrated control of Canada's corporate operations in Toronto. Thus, for example, about 200 of the top 500 Canadian companies and more than half the country's largest financial institutions have head offices in the Toronto area. In 1983, 48 per cent of the total Canadian computer capacity was located in Toronto; the next largest concentration, in Ottawa, was less than 12 per cent.

While Toronto's waterfront redevelopment has been driven by global and local economic restructuring, its timing, pace, and detailed characteristics have been mediated by major waterfront interest groups. These interest groups include many government bodies, special-purpose agencies, and private-sector organizations. This fragmentation is in sharp contrast to the time when the Toronto Harbour Commissioners implemented its 1912 Plan, and has contributed substantially to the difficulty in planning the waterfront.





# **3. Economic Context of Toronto's Waterfront Development**

This section of the Report examines changing patterns in global production processes and recent trends in economic activity in the Toronto area. These are the context in which waterfront redevelopment is taking place and in which the many interest groups continue to operate. Our approach assumes the need to analyse Toronto's waterfront in light of broader economic realities: global and regional restructuring of production will continue to influence waterfront activity.

## ***De-industrialization of Toronto's Economy***

During the last few decades, many manufacturing plants have been shut or moved from the Toronto area. Certain locations became de-industrialized as the result of global reorganization of economic activity; this process has been defined as the widespread and systematic dis-investment in manufacturing productive capacity. [Bluestone & Harrison, 1982, p. 6.]

Large enterprises have undertaken company-wide rationalization in an attempt to increase productivity; plants have been closed or moved from traditional industrial centres as part of the process of economic adjustment.

Some suggest that the moving or closing of plants has been the result of increased market value for industrial land, which has risen so much that sites have become too expensive for industrial activity. As entrepreneurs became aware that they were able to receive substantially more by selling or renting their land than by using it for industrial activity, land-use patterns changed.

Land economists typically refer to the activity yielding the largest return on a plot of land as its 'highest and best use'. An unrestricted free market for land, they would argue, results in an ordering of land according to these 'best' uses. In this context, it would be natural for industry to abandon central city locations for areas where there is less competition for land.

De-industrialization has been hailed by some economists as a difficult, painful, but temporary adjustment to the realities of international economic competition. They view the process as leading to a more desirable allocation of resources with benefits for all concerned. Critics, on the other hand, see industrial production activity as central to a healthy economy; they argue





*Shipping farm equipment that was produced in Toronto.*

Photo courtesy of Toronto Harbour Commission Archives, PC 18/2/1029.



that, although the service sector is undoubtedly important, manufacturing is fundamental for producing the basic elements within an economy. Manufacturing creates more and larger linkages to other productive activities within a region, so that, when industry grows, it generates economic spin-offs.

De-industrialization involves the rapid movement of industrial capital on a regional or global scale by corporations seeking competitive advantages anywhere in the world, a process that is frequently based on the availability of a large pool of cheap labour. These movements of capital are part of management strategies for maximizing profits, irrespective of the social costs of such decisions.

Social costs — increased unemployment payments, welfare, and other related social service and health care costs — are not part of standard economic analyses, which attempt to measure the potential advantages and disadvantages of each enterprise's investment decision, but only from that enterprise's own perspective.

Nonetheless, plant closings have considerable impact on any community, ranging from individual psychological and health problems to financial and social problems for the community as a whole. For example, de-industrialization can contribute to the polarization of society as the number of people in lower-income groups increases faster than the number in high-income groups. (Particular areas, many on or adjacent to the waterfront, are undergoing substantial decreases in industrial activity and may well experience these kinds of social and financial turmoil.)

A municipality's loss of industrial activity leads to greater difficulty in managing the local economy: as primary and secondary industries flee, its ability to influence the composition and direction of its economic growth becomes more tenuous. The continued loss of industrial activity means less economic diversity for a municipality and a consequent increase in potential instability.

Financial analysts frequently measure community economic strength, at least in part, according to the extent of diversification in the economy. A lower financial credit rating for a municipality, resulting from such an analysis, increases the cost of borrowing money for infrastructure and other municipal development projects.



In assessing the impact of broad economic trends on Toronto's waterfront, the Work Group arrived at two major conclusions: first, without underestimating the importance of the service sector to Toronto's economic growth, there is no doubt that a healthy local economy must include a strong industrial presence, either by maintaining existing competitive firms or by attracting new growth industries. Industry contributes to the wealth-producing capacity of the region and provides the potential for increasing real economic growth. Many service-sector activities exist in order to maintain or enhance industrial capacity and income; therefore a loss of industrial capacity will inevitably mean losses in the service sector.

Second, the Work Group is convinced that it is neither inevitable nor desirable to remove all industrial activity from Toronto's waterfront. A recent report by a commission studying Victoria's waterfront came to the conclusion that, "Once industrial land is given over to residential or mixed-use development, it will never again revert to industrial use, and the economic health of the community could suffer."

[*The Financial Post*, November 2, 1987.]

In other words, it is a one-way street: once diverted from industrial use, land is almost never again zoned for it.

### ***Employment Trends in the Toronto Area and on the Waterfront<sup>3</sup>***

Recent trends in employment in the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of Toronto and the region of Metropolitan Toronto (which is smaller than the Toronto CMA) reveal similar patterns of change (Tables 1 and 2). Continuing a long-term decline, the percentage of full-time employment in manufacturing fell between 1983 and 1987 — from approximately 22 to 20 per cent in Metro Toronto, and from 27 to 24 per cent in the Toronto CMA in those years.

3. Geographical zones called "Basic Planning Units" are used to define the Metropolitan Toronto Waterfront. These units are relatively small areas for which the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto collects considerable data. The Basic Planning Units defining the Waterfront are:  
City of Toronto: 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 19, 20, 21, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407 (blocks 27, 33, and 36 only), 408, 409 (blocks 59 and 60 only)  
City of Etobicoke: 200, 201, 203, 206, 217 (block 64 only), 700, 701, 702, 706  
City of Scarborough: 337, 361, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 907, 908, 911, 913, 914, 934, 968, 977.





Map 1.

METROPOLITAN TORONTO WATERFRONT:  
DEFINITION USED FOR THE COLLECTION  
OF EMPLOYMENT DATA



While manufacturing employment as a percentage of total employment has declined, the absolute level has increased: from more than 240,000 workers in 1983 to about 257,000 in 1987 in Metro, and from 381,600 to 412,100 in Toronto CMA in those years. In other words, despite the relative decline of manufacturing employment, it remains a very significant sector for the overall Toronto economy.

Employment on the Metropolitan Toronto waterfront (Map 1) is presented in Tables 3 to 7. Total employment has increased from more than 68,000 in 1981 to almost 79,000 in 1987, a gain of 15 per cent. Interestingly, in 1981 manufacturing accounted for more employment, 23,853, than any other sector; office employment, with 23,623 workers, was second.

Decreased industrial activity was soon reflected in employment statistics and, by 1983, there were more people working in offices than in manufacturing. Office-sector employment has continued to grow, while manufacturing is the only sector to record an actual decrease in the number of workers.

The largest increase (by percentage) in waterfront employment between 1981 and 1987 was in recreation, where there was a 78 per cent growth. (The 250 per cent growth in residential employment appears impressive but this large increase results from a minuscule base — there were fewer than 500 people in that sector in 1981.) Employment increased 58 per cent in the retail shopping and service sectors; 42 per cent in the institutional sector; and 26 per cent in the office sector.

The largest increase in number of workers was in the office sector, which rose by 6,158 employees between 1981 and 1987. The change reflects the shift to service-based economic activities; retail shopping and personal services had the second largest increase: an additional 5,910 employees. Manufacturing employment fell by slightly more than 6,000 workers; that means, on average, that almost 1,000 industrial jobs were lost in each of the seven years.

Clearly, the process of dislocating industrial activity has hit Toronto's waterfront hard. The Work Group is convinced that the trends are not inevitable or natural and that governments should adopt creative and coordinated policies, in cooperation with the private sector, to maintain a healthy industrial presence on the waterfront.



**TABLE 1: Total Employment for  
the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto by Year**

	1981	Percentage
Office	439,034	41.3
Manufacturing	301,069	28.4
Retail	184,212	17.3
Institutional and Other	137,876	13.0
Total	1,062,191	100

	1983	1985	1987
Manufacturing & Warehousing	240,574	257,390	257,038
Retail	133,579	136,733	145,273
Service	117,766	127,760	138,853
Office	455,482	459,520	553,855
Institutional	129,284	139,674	50,124
Other	19,249	26,451	30,982
Total	1,095,934	1,183,528	1,276,125

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, *Employment, Land-Use and Assessment Data*.



**TABLE 2: Total Employment for the Census  
Metropolitan Area of Toronto by Year  
(000's)**

Employment Category	1981*	1983	1985	1987
Manufacturing	308.6	381.6	366.1	412.1
Construction	30.1	50.3	67.1	67.7
Transportation/Communication/ Utilities	95.9	106.4	109.7	125.5
Trade and Commerce	178.2	278.2	311.7	334.2
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate	105.2	125.2	148.2	160.2
Community Business & Personal Services	158.4	479.2	509.7	606.0
Total	878.8	1424.8	1554.1	1705.7

\* Prior to 1983, data were restricted to firms with 20 employees or more.

Sources: Statistics Canada, 72-002, *Employment Earnings and Hours*, for the month of April of each year.



**TABLE 3: Metro Toronto Waterfront Employment  
by Municipality for 1981**

Employment Category	Scarborough	Toronto	Etobicoke	Metro Waterfront
Residential	403	1	91	495
Manufacturing	1,150	13,990	8,713	23,853
Transportation/Storage	253	3,096	139	3,488
Retail Shopping/Services	4,142	4,124	1,854	10,120
Office	3,141	17,741	2,741	23,623
Institutional	2,269	1,521	652	4,442
Recreational	1,073	1,180	61	2,314
Municipal Total	12,431	41,653	14,251	68,335

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, *Employment, Land-use and Assessment Data*.



**TABLE 4: Metro Toronto Waterfront Employment  
by Municipality for 1983**

Employment Category	Scarborough	Toronto	Etobicoke	Metro Waterfront
Residential	381	121	72	574
Resource Production	3	0	0	3
Manufacturing	1,186	10,556	6,700	18,442
Transportation/Storage	470	1,451	16	1,937
Retail Shopping/Services	4,780	5,449	2,166	12,395
Office	3,837	16,967	1,868	22,672
Institutional	2,258	1,296	573	4,127
Recreational	140	2,109	107	2,356
Municipal Total	13,055	37,949	11,502	62,506

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, *Employment, Land-use and Assessment Data*.



**TABLE 5: Metro Toronto Waterfront Employment  
by Municipality for 1985**

Employment Category	Scarborough	Toronto	Etobicoke	Metro Waterfront
Residential	669	317	88	1,074
Resource Production & Extraction	1	0	64	65
Manufacturing	1,294	12,606	7,586	21,486
Transportation/Storage	433	1,739	162	2,334
Retail Shopping/Services	5,302	6,692	2,079	14,073
Office	6,066	19,288	1,844	27,198
Institutional	2,675	1,181	933	4,849
Recreational	196	3,284	66	3,546
Municipal Total	16,636	45,107	12,882	74,625

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, *Employment, Land-use and Assessment Data*.



**TABLE 6: Metro Toronto Waterfront Employment  
by Municipality for 1987**

Employment Category	Scarborough	Toronto	Etobicoke	Metro Waterfront
Residential	851	301	91	1,243
Resource Production & Extraction	1	8	1	10
Manufacturing	1,683	11,133	4,953	17,769
Transportation/Storage	375	2,944	244	3,563
Retail Shopping/Services	5,666	8,277	2,087	16,030
Office	6,864	20,141	2,776	29,781
Institutional	3,289	2,108	891	6,288
Recreational	163	3,846	104	4,113
Municipal Total	18,892	48,758	11,147	78,797

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, *Employment, Land-use and Assessment Data*.



**TABLE 7: Metro Toronto Waterfront Employment by Years**

Employment Category	1981	1983	1985	1987
Residential	495	574	1,074	1,243
Resource Production & Extraction	0	3	65	10
Manufacturing	23,853	18,442	21,486	17,769
Transportation/Storage	3,488	1,937	2,334	3,563
Retail Shopping/Services	10,120	12,295	14,073	16,030
Office	23,623	22,672	27,198	29,781
Institutional	4,442	4,127	4,849	6,288
Recreational	2,314	2,356	3,546	4,113
Municipal Total	68,335	62,506	74,625	78,797

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, *Employment, Land-use and Assessment Data*.



## **Tourism in Toronto's Economy**

Throughout Toronto's history, the waterfront has been used as a site for industrial, commercial, park, and recreational activities. Today's waterfront is home to a considerable number of recreational and leisure activities that are related to tourism, one of Canada's fastest-growing economic sectors.

In 1986, Statistics Canada estimated that foreign visitors and Canadian travellers spent \$20 billion on tourism products and services in this country, accounting for approximately four per cent of Canada's gross domestic product that year.

It is not surprising, therefore, that tourism has a major economic impact on Metro. The Metro Toronto Economic Impact Study, commissioned by the Metropolitan Toronto Convention and Visitors Association, estimated that, in 1987, the value to Metro Toronto of direct expenditures because of tourism amounted to \$2.65 billion. Approximately 108,329 person-years of employment were generated, both directly and indirectly, by this sector and \$3.7 billion of income were generated: \$1.9 billion in employment income and \$1.8 billion in business and other income. The industry also generated \$947 million in tax revenues for the governments of Canada, Ontario, and Metropolitan Toronto. Since 1984, the report says, Metro Toronto's tourism industry has performed better than its economy overall and has outperformed the finance, insurance, and real estate industries.

While tourism in Metro Toronto is flourishing, recent experience in a number of American port cities throws new light on some conventional tourist-oriented redevelopment projects. For example, festival markets were initiated by James W. Rouse in the 1970s with such phenomenal successes as Boston's Faneuil Hall in 1976 and Baltimore's Harbourplace in 1980. These "inner-city retail emporiums" [Robert Guskind and Neal Peirce, "Faltering Festivals", *National Journal*, Sept. 17, 1988, p. 2307.] have become a standard feature of waterfront revitalization schemes. Rouse's Faneuil Hall formula has been repeated in other cities with only minor local adaptations. A number of the more recently developed festival markets have fallen on hard times, and as reported in a *National Journal* article:



Several of the smaller cities...have painfully discovered, however, that the nonstop circus of bright lights, food stalls and boutiques isn't enough to stave off a tide of red ink. The festival markets have been vexed by smaller-than-expected crowds, sagging local economies, sluggish sales and poor tenant mixes. And with dozens of them operating in cities coast to coast, the novelty seems to have worn off. [*ibid*]

Quantitative and comprehensive estimates of the impact of waterfront tourism are not available. Nonetheless, given the level of cultural programming, the recreational facilities, and the number of other events located or directly linked to the waterfront, there can be no doubt that the impact of tourism is substantial. For example, the Harbourfront Corporation estimates that 20 per cent of its 3.5 million annual visitors come from the United States.

We believe that a significant potential exists for expanding tourism by building on its existing base and, at the same time, not jeopardizing other waterfront industrial initiatives. (Details of a joint public-private venture that would co-ordinate recreational, entertainment, cultural, and sports events are discussed later in this report.) The coordination of resources and programs among waterfront institutions, such as Exhibition Place, Ontario Place, and Harbourfront — given their diverse assets, resources, and programming — could enhance tourism.

A new public-private agency, given significant administrative and marketing roles, could be the impetus by which tourism's potential could be realized.







# 4. Current Plans, Issues, and Opportunities

**N**umerous plans have been proposed for redevelopment of Toronto's waterfront. The issues and opportunities arising from these plans have been organized into 12 distinct geographic areas (Map 2), according to which our analyses and findings are presented.

The geographical areas are, from west to east: the Etobicoke waterfront; Exhibition Place and Ontario Place; the Toronto Island Airport; the Railway Lands, Harbourfront; the Central Bayfront; the East Bayfront; the Port Industrial District; the Port of Toronto; the Leslie Street Spit; the Gardiner East (including the Greenwood Racetrack area); the Eastern beaches; and the Scarborough waterfront. In addition to these areas, we have examined the proposals for the 1996 Olympics and the World Fair 2000.

## 1. The Etobicoke Waterfront (Map 3)



Map 3. Etobicoke Waterfront

## **The Lakeshore Psychiatric Hospital Site**

Discussions on redeveloping the Lakeshore Psychiatric Hospital site, which comprises 26 hectares (63.5 acres) and 26 buildings, have been under way for some time. The provincial government, Humber College, the Metro Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (MTRCA), the local municipality, and members of the public have been actively considering future uses for the site. The in-patient hospital beds were closed in 1979, but out-patient facilities are still in use.

As recently as 1986, the MTRCA wanted to acquire the entire site as part of a five-year plan; in 1988, a significant portion of the property was transferred to the MTRCA, and is to be used for open space, including Colonel Samuel Smith Park.

The 13 hectares (32 acres) that are controlled by the Ontario Ministry of Government Services, and an adjacent 7.3 hectares (18 acres) owned by Humber College, have been the subject of a joint study of the property's potential for mixed-use development, including housing.

Recently, three alternative land-use plans have been put forward by Hemson Consulting Ltd. and Baird-Sampson Associates. The alternative plans were presented to the public at an open house and a revised plan is in the final stages of being formulated. When it is finished, approval from the City of Etobicoke will be necessary before the plan becomes policy.

While details are not yet available, all three proposals recommended extensive redevelopment for retail space and approximately 1,800–2,300 housing units; in addition, historic buildings and open areas on the site (the quadrangle and eight cottages) would be retained, as would open space north of the quadrangle, and an office building at the corner of Kipling and the Lakeshore. Community mental health and special services may be relocated in the site and there may be new vehicular access to Humber College from Kipling Avenue, which would be extended as a boulevard to the lakefront. A hotel complex has been suggested but now seems doubtful.



The issue of future use is a hotly debated issue in the community, where there are strong and conflicting opinions. For example, there is both firm support for, and opposition to, establishing affordable housing on the site. Local officials and community groups are concerned that there is inadequate provision of open space in the plans; they are also worried about the impact of increased residential densities and possible social change in the Mimico community. Moreover, there are some questions about the overall adequacy of basic elements of infrastructure such as sewage treatment.

We see this site as particularly desirable, and can understand the strength of opinions on all sides. It is, indeed, rare for such a prime property to become available for redevelopment and those with a stake in it are, quite understandably, highly motivated to ensure that it is *their* vision that prevails.

Preliminary redevelopment concepts appear to use valuable under-utilized land quite well, with a mixture of residential/commercial/retail uses, public amenities, and green space. They should benefit the immediate and surrounding area in other than strictly economic terms without displacing nearby existing economic activities.

Although, in general, the Work Group advocates maintenance and expansion of industrial activity on the waterfront, we believe that it would not be appropriate at this site.

### **The Motel Strip**

The Motel Strip is approximately 20 hectares (50 acres) on the south side of Lakeshore Boulevard, between Park Lawn Road and the Palace Pier (Map 3). It includes 15 motels, a tavern, and a restaurant.

In February 1988, the Etobicoke City Council approved a secondary plan which allows existing motels and hotels to continue operating, while diversifying the area to include hotel, retail, office, and residential uses. Although the City has approved the plan, a serious challenge by environmental and residential groups was to have been mounted at the Ontario Municipal Board. The groups believed the plan should be subject to a provincial environmental assessment.

The provincial government has recently announced that such an environmental assessment will not be undertaken. However, the province indicated that the following three conditions will have to be met before redevelopment of the Motel



Strip is approved. First, an environmental management master plan will have to be completed. Details about this master plan are not specified, but topics like lakefilling and mitigation of contaminated sediment will have to be addressed.

Second, the Ontario Municipal Board will have to approve the master plan before zoning bylaws are enacted.

Third, an environmental consultant will be on the redevelopment site to ensure that construction follows the master plan.

The most ambitious proposal in the motel strip area has been tabled by Camrost Development Corporation, which owns or controls more than 10 hectares (25 acres) in the area. The scheme calls for a mixed-use development to be built over a period of five to ten years. Phase One would include luxury condominiums, a hotel, retail shops enclosed in a glass-domed galleria, entertainment facilities, a marina, and office space.

While Etobicoke City Council has supported the Camrost project enthusiastically, there are concerns about density, lack of affordable housing, and the possibility of a negative impact on local residents and industry. There has been a call for an environmental assessment of proposed lakefilling.

The apprehensions of various citizens and interest groups must be considered and, of course, any proposals must meet provincial affordable housing requirements as well as environmental standards for lakefilling. That said, the proposals for redevelopment would mean substantial revitalization and rehabilitation of the area and we believe they warrant consideration and support.

Camrost's proposed development is only one element that would have an impact on the environment in the broader area. Proposals for other parcels of land on the strip have been submitted by Newport Development Corporation and Phase Two is being planned for the Palace Pier complex. These two plans call for the development of luxury condominiums, a hotel and some office and commercial space. The Humber River and the capacity of the Etobicoke sewage treatment plant are significant and must be part of any environmental assessment.

We believe that redevelopment of the Motel Strip would offer obvious economic advantages to the Mimico community; what may be more important to the City of Etobicoke, however, is the opportunity to create a recreation and entertainment focus on the waterfront.



## **Opportunities for Industrial Employment on the Etobicoke Waterfront**

Initially, the Work Group was of the opinion that the style of proposals for the Mimico Creek area, the Motel Strip, and the Lakeshore Psychiatric Hospital site might stem the tide of de-industrialization and encourage retention of the Christie and McGuinness sites for industrial uses. The three redevelopment proposals contained a mix of land uses that appeared to be compatible with neighbouring industrial sites. That would have been in sharp contrast to what has happened in the past, at the Goodyear plant (which is slated primarily for residential redevelopment) and other sites in the area.

The McGuinness site, however, has recently been acquired by Camrost Corporation, apparently for public and assisted housing with some retail and commercial space, a perfect example of the rapid pace at which de-industrialization in the Toronto region is taking place. Presumably, the plans for affordable housing are associated with the development of condominium residences on the other Camrost site. The acquisition and redevelopment of the McGuinness site for housing is one further example of the rapid pace of de-industrialization within the Toronto region.

If development proceeds as now proposed, the Christie Brown & Co. plant will be essentially the final vestige of the Mimico Industrial Park. While Christie has resolved to remain in its present location, the extent of de-industrialization occurring around the site may ultimately encourage the company to relocate.

A similar situation exists on Lakeshore Boulevard at the Goodyear plant. This facility was recently acquired by the Daniels Group and the site is apparently to be redeveloped for residential uses, except for a small part of the northern side, which is intended for industry. The loss of the Goodyear plant was a pivotal event in the de-industrialization of southern Etobicoke. Unless there is direct municipal action in support of employers and their workers, the loss of Gabriel Shock Absorber, Chrysler, and others may be only a matter of time.

The decline in jobs in these industrial areas, now and in the future, is likely to be permanent. Redevelopment projects create short-term construction jobs; longer-term employment depends upon proposals for land use that include generating



employment. At issue is the net reduction in the total number of jobs, the quality and value of current jobs lost versus those that may be created in future, and the social and economic costs to dislocated workers and the community.

The tables in "Economic Context of Waterfront Development", particularly Tables 3 to 6, show that Etobicoke has lost many waterfront jobs. Total employment in all sectors declined from 14,251 in 1981 to 11,147 in all categories by 1987. The decline in manufacturing jobs over the same period is even more significant: from 8,713 jobs in 1981 to only 4,953 in 1987. No other waterfront area has suffered an absolute decline in total employment.

These figures are in sharp contrast to the stated policies of the City of Etobicoke, which support economic and industrial development. The failure to sustain specific programs of re-investment in manufacturing and other industrial activity is obvious. In the same way, replacing industrial zoning with other uses isolates and weakens existing industries, and accelerates the loss of industrial and manufacturing employment.

The specific situation in Etobicoke is a good illustration of the process of de-industrialization at work. The local municipality loses opportunities to retain and attract high value-added, clean and desirable industries, and it moves the municipality to a less diversified economic base. That in turn renders the municipality vulnerable during economic downturns and may adversely affect credit ratings. This process ultimately leads to higher taxes on all residents of the community.


## ***2. Exhibition Place and Ontario Place***

### **Exhibition Place**

Exhibition Place consists of 77.3 hectares (191 acres) zoned as parkland (Map 4). Permanent buildings and Exhibition Stadium cover about 20.2 hectares (50 acres) of the site. Another 13.3 hectares (33 acres) are grassed or landscaped. The site is frequently referred to as the CNE or "Ex" after the annual fair that is held there.

Exhibition Place is under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and is operated on Metro's behalf by a Board of Governors which consists of Councillors appointed





*Map 4. Exhibition Place & Ontario Place*

by Metro Council as well as citizen appointees. A representative of Ontario Place also serves on the Board of Governors. The Chief General Manager is responsible for the day-to-day operation of Exhibition Place. He has a staff of 325 permanent employees and several thousand temporary employees on the site excluding the employees of other employers on the site (e.g., Beaver Foods, Ainsworth, Black and McDonald, Metro Parks).

The prime tenant of Exhibition Place is the annual Canadian National Exhibition (the CNE, or "Ex"). Responsibility for operation of the fair is vested in the Canadian National Exhibition Association (CNEA), which is composed of representatives from a wide variety of government, private, and voluntary organizations.

Association members elect a Board of Directors each year, 25 per cent of whom are Councillors appointed by Metro Council. At present, the Chief General Manager of Exhibition Place holds the same position with the CNEA.

Attendance at the Ex has dropped from a peak of 3 million in 1979 to little more than 2 million in recent years. The decline is usually attributed to competition from other entertainment centres (among them Canada's Wonderland and Harbourfront) and to a perception by some people that the Ex is of low quality and offers poor value. However, the fair continues to make a profit; in 1987, it contributed \$5.6 million to Exhibition Place's coffers and, thereby, to Metro. The CNEA Board of Directors has established a committee to consider new and innovative programming as a step to improving attendance and profitability.

Access to Ontario Place, the Hockey/Sports Hall of Fame and the Marine Museum is included with admission to the Ex and a ticket to major events at the Ex includes admission to both Exhibition Place and Ontario Place. The Hockey Hall of Fame is expected to vacate its Exhibition Place site, a loss for the CNE, which features the Hall of Fame as a free attraction during the fair.

Another major tenant of Exhibition Place is the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair, which remains a popular and profitable attraction in the Coliseum.

The buildings at Exhibition Place are extensively and increasingly being used for trade, consumer, and craft shows. In 1988, excluding the CNE and the Royal Winter Fair, more than 100 events took place in Exhibition Place buildings on a total of more than 1,600 event-days, attracting about 3 million people.

The Automotive Building, Coliseum West Annex, Coliseum East Annex, Industry Building, Industry Building extensions and the Queen Elizabeth Building provide 62,160 square metres (669,000 square feet) gross of heated exhibit space. The Better Living Building and the Horticultural Building have also been used for events. Because the season for trade and consumer shows is between October and May, increasing demand for exhibit space has caused Exhibition Place management to consider heating other buildings.

The theatre in the Queen Elizabeth Building has been underutilized for many years. Management is attempting to ensure year-round use of this fine facility.



In May 1985, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto established an Executive Task Force to review possible future users for Exhibition Place; the group was composed of representatives from Metro Council, the Exhibition Place Board of Governors, and the eight major uses of Exhibition Place. Their report, *Future Uses of Exhibition Place*, was issued in March 1987 and urges that the Canadian National Exhibition and the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair continue to be presented at Exhibition Place.

It suggests that the western portion of the grounds be used for cultural, entertainment, and recreational purposes, while the eastern part include a temporary midway, as well as trade and consumer shows, exhibitions, etc. In addition, the report calls for the Board of Governors to seek proposals for "the construction of 69,675 square metres (750,000 square feet) gross of new exhibit space and operation of a major trade centre at Exhibition Place" [p. vii]. The report says that "70 percent of the incremental activity that will result from the construction of the trade centre will accrue to the Metropolitan Toronto area. Direct and indirect incremental employment levels are estimated at 4,500 person years, while incremental wages and salaries are estimated at \$85 million" [p. vii].

The trade centre recommendation is based on an analysis undertaken by Currie, Coopers & Lybrand in 1983 and updated in 1985. That analysis was reported to recommend that Metropolitan Toronto expand its trade exhibition space capacities by creating a major international centre. The analysis indicated that such a centre would help manufacturers in Metropolitan Toronto — especially emerging threshold and innovative industries — market products more successfully.

Capital construction was estimated at \$165 million, based on a construction cost of \$1,570.00 per gross square metre. Currie, Coopers & Lybrand suggested that profits from such a trade centre would be insufficient to service a significant debt load, and capital assistance would be needed from government or the private sector.

The Executive Task Force concluded [p. viii] that construction and operation incentives to the private sector, in the form of capital cost allowances, might be necessary.

Potential developers might also be attracted by a proposal for such on-site ancillary projects as offices, display areas and, nearby, a hotel.



Development of an international trade centre is strongly supported by Metro Toronto's Economic Development Department, which believes it is important to the successful implementation of Metro's new economic development strategy.

The Work Group believes that the international trade centre project has the potential to improve the prospects for industrial production and, hence, the well-being of the Metro Toronto area. However, a hotel might not be profitable in this area.

The future of Exhibition Stadium is an important issue for Exhibition Place. With the June, 1989 opening of SkyDome, major sporting attractions, such as the Blue Jays and the Argonauts, and some concert attractions will be lost to Exhibition Place. As discussed later in more detail, the Toronto Ontario Olympic Council is proposing that Toronto's 1996 Olympic bid include construction of a major new stadium on the site of Exhibition Stadium. The new facility would be used as the main venue for the Olympics and would contain approximately 80,000 seats. An alternative suggestion would see horse racing move from Greenwood Racetrack to Exhibition Stadium, complete with stables at the Horse Palace in the Coliseum. This would free the Greenwood site for other uses. The Exhibition Place Task Force recommended that any 'downsizing' of the stadium await a decision on Toronto's Olympic bid.

The Work Group heard differing points of view about the consequences to the CNE of relocating the professional sports teams to the SkyDome. One estimate was that the fair will lose revenue because large numbers of sports patrons will no longer spill over to the CNE. Other projections, however, suggest that, without the Blue Jay and Argo games, the CNE will have a more flexible schedule and will be able to book more concerts and other special events during the Ex.

A member of Toronto's City Council has suggested that the area now occupied by the stadium be used to link Exhibition Place and Ontario Place if the stadium is demolished. The possibility of implementing such a suggestion, of course, depends on a much-improved working relationship between the two facilities.



## **Ontario Place**

The Jobs, Opportunities and Economic Growth Work Group was unable to arrange a meeting with a representative of Ontario Place, although several attempts were made. Therefore, we were not able to review and consider the current plans that the Ontario Place Board and management have for the site.

Ontario Place (Map 4) is operated by its Board on behalf of the Government of Ontario, which developed and controls the site. A decline in attendance and serious financial problems in recent years have led the provincial government to appoint a new Board chairperson to develop a plan that will reverse these negative trends. Development of such a plan is still under way.

The Work Group found an apparent tension and lack of co-operation between officials of Ontario Place and Exhibition Place which, given their proximity and complementary programs, must be resolved.

It should be noted, in the same vein, that there is a need for better coordination and cooperation among all publicly controlled waterfront entertainment, recreation, and exhibition facilities, including — in addition to Exhibition Place and Ontario Place — Harbourfront, the Metro Convention Centre, SkyDome, Roy Thomson Hall, the St. Lawrence Centre, the O'Keefe Centre, the CN Tower, Fort York, the Marine Museum, the Toronto Islands parks, and Coronation Park.

In our view, a new intergovernmental organization should be established to coordinate activities and enable each facility to make effective use of the amenities of the other organizations along the waterfront. Such a co-ordinating body would prevent duplication of events — such as the three circuses that took place last year at virtually the same time at the CNE, Ontario Place, and Harbourfront!

## **3. Toronto Island Airport**

### **Background to Airport Issues**

While the Toronto Island Airport (Map 5) is celebrating its fiftieth birthday this year, aircraft arrived in the City as early as 1903, when barnstorming flights are said to have landed on Toronto's beaches. In the 1920s, an 'air harbour' for amphibious planes was established at the foot of what is now





*Map 5. Toronto Island Airport*

Freeland Street. Shortly thereafter regular airmail service was established, utilizing the air harbour.

Recognizing the impending importance of air transport, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners began planning for a waterfront airport and, by the early '20s, the THC's Chief Engineer, Edward L. Cousins, presented a plan for development of an airport. It had apparently been designed in cooperation with a respected Toronto architect, Alfred Chapman, who had been involved in other THC projects, including Sunnyside Park. Although the Cousins-Chapman plan was not implemented, it helped convince people of the need for a municipal airport. By the end of the 1920s, Toronto's City Council had been persuaded and committees were established to investigate the feasibility and location of such a facility.

In 1937, Toronto City Council approved construction of a permanent municipal airport on the Toronto Islands and an auxiliary airport at Malton. The former was opened in 1938 and named George VI Airport, in honour of an upcoming Royal visit, but the facility is now known as the Toronto Island Airport (TIA).

In 1939, the City leased the Airport site to the federal government but retained the Harbour Commission as administrators and operators.

With the advent of World War II, the Airport became a training base for members of the Norwegian Air Force in exile from their Nazi-occupied country. In 1943, the Norwegians returned to their homeland and the Airport was used by the Royal Canadian Air Force.

At the end of the war, the airport at Malton became the new centre of scheduled air traffic and the Island Airport was used for a commercial flying school and for general aviation. With the growth of Malton (renamed Lester B. Pearson International Airport in 1982) as the centre of commercial aviation, the City relinquished its title to TIA to the federal government. In return, Ottawa agreed to make major improvements to the Island Airport. Completed in 1962, they included construction of a 1,200-metre (4,000 feet) runway and a hangar; installation of runway lighting; and installation and operation of an air traffic control service.

In the 1960s and '70s, the Island Airport became less important in comparison to the other Toronto airports: in 1966, there were 228,000 aircraft movements but, by 1976, that figure had declined by 24 per cent. This decrease occurred over a period when the six Toronto airports increased their total combined aircraft movements by 22 per cent.

By the mid-1970s, it had become clear that a decision regarding the TIA's long-term future was necessary, for at least three reasons. First, airport operations were unprofitable; second, the Federal Government became committed to Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft technology; and third, the public was concerned about the future of the Airport. In 1974, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners asked for a federal subsidy, which the Government of Canada seemed willing to grant — provided agreement on the future of the TIA could be reached. As a result, the Joint Committee-Toronto Island Airport was



established with representation from all levels of government. Intended as a consultative body, it examined a number of possible options for the Airport.

The second reason for concern was the federal government's heavy investment in STOL aircraft technology, a type of service that was beginning to be profitable. In the early 1970s, the Government of Canada became committed to a leadership position in the development of STOL aircraft. As part of a demonstration project with the De Havilland Corporation, the government used the Toronto Island Airport to test STOL aircraft. STOL service was introduced between Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa in 1974. The demonstration showed it could be profitable and a number of companies subsequently applied to the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) for a licence to provide the service.

In 1980 the Canadian Transport Commission began hearings on the application by Canavia Transit Company to operate a scheduled STOL service from the Island Airport. The CTC eventually concluded that STOL service in the Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto triangle would improve overall air services. But it declined to grant the licence to Canavia because Transport Canada was not committed to making necessary infrastructure improvements to the TIA, and because the City of Toronto was opposed to STOL service there.

The third reason a decision on the Airport was required was that the public had become concerned about the long-term future of this valuable piece of the waterfront. As early as 1968, the THC envisioned major changes to the Airport as indicated in its *Bold Concept* plan. Under the plan, the Airport would be relocated and expanded and a 50,000-person Harbour City would be built at the TIA's present location and on adjacent lands. Neighbourhood groups feared expansion of the Airport would create unbearable noise levels and would be incompatible with existing land uses. Business groups wanted a defined time frame on which to base private investment decisions. Small aircraft owners and pilots wanted an assured site for their planes.

In 1983, after considerable political debate, a three-way agreement was reached between the Minister of Transport acting on behalf of the federal government, the City of Toronto, and the Toronto Harbour Commissioners. According to this



Tripartite Agreement (which gives the THC the right to manage and operate the Airport for 50 years):

- the Island Airport would be a permanent public airport for general aviation and limited commercial STOL service;
- no jets or noisy aircraft would be permitted at the Airport except for medical emergencies and during the CNE air show;
- aircraft movements were to be limited by a Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF);
- the Airport was not to expand beyond its present boundaries and runways were not to be lengthened;
- no bridge or tunnel was to be constructed to the mainland;
- the Minister of Transport agreed to seek funding for deficits incurred by the THC in the operation of the Airport; and
- Transport Canada agreed to reimburse the THC for losses incurred from 1975 to 1983 and to fund improvements to airport facilities.

Even though the Tripartite Agreement was signed only six years ago, pressure to alter the existing character of the Island Airport continues to mount, principally because of the success of STOL commuter service. In 1984, City Express purchased Air Atonabee, which had been operating from the Island Airport for a decade, and began a STOL service between Toronto and Ottawa using Dash 7 aircraft. The operations of City Express have grown rapidly, and it currently has a fleet of four Dash 7s and four of the newer Dash 8s. In 1984, there were approximately 47,000 passengers but, by 1987, the number of travellers had increased to 400,000, of whom an estimated 86 per cent were business travellers. To make any significant changes to the Airport, however, the Tripartite Agreement would have to be opened for renegotiation.

## **Issues and Opportunities**

The Royal Commission's public hearings began on January 16, 1989 with considerable discussion and debate on the Toronto Island Airport. Subsequent hearings on the Airport are scheduled later this year. The Work Group, which had, in the main, concluded its discussions before the public hearings began, does not intend to summarize the proceedings of the Commission's public consultations in this report. But it can be a vehicle



for focusing attention on the major issues surrounding the Island Airport, as they affect our interest in jobs, opportunities, and economic growth.

Those issues can be grouped into two general categories: the location of the Airport and the appropriate level of Airport facilities and services. Although not totally independent of each other, the categories can be discussed separately and we found it easier to answer the question of location than to define an appropriate level of facilities and services.

After reviewing the two Airport sites suggested in the *Bold Concept II* plan, the Leslie Street Spit and an area south of the Toronto Islands, and after considering suggestions that the Airport not be relocated on any site on the Toronto waterfront, we concluded that the Island Airport should remain at its present location. To relocate it to either of the two suggested sites would be to fly in the face of well-established neighbourhood, environmental, and economic concerns. Removing the Airport entirely would be throwing away a valuable resource.

The issue of appropriate levels of facilities and services is rather more complex and involves a number of components. Perhaps the most prominent is the question of access to and from the Airport. Other aspects of this general issue include: the kinds of aircraft that should be permitted; the compatibility of aircraft movements and Airport operations with waterfront housing or other land uses; the adequacy and possible use of the existing terminal building and the question of whether a new one is needed; and identifying an appropriate balance between general and commercial aviation uses at TIA.

Access to the Toronto Island Airport has always involved crossing the Western Channel from the mainland. The 122-metre (400-foot) gap at the southern end of Bathurst Street has been the centre of considerable controversy for many years. The Harbour Commissioners' 1912 Plan called for a bridge over the Channel to connect with a grand shoreline boulevard that would run from the Humber River in the west to Victoria Park Avenue in the east. Although most of the objectives of the 1912 Plan were achieved, the bridge was never built.

In 1935, even before the decision to build an airport on the Island was made, the federal government began what was regarded as a make-work tunnel project in the Channel. It



quickly came to a halt, but there is no evidence that Ottawa's initial decision to build the tunnel was ever rescinded.

Currently City Express, the THC, various government agencies, and many passengers are concerned about the ability of the ferry service to provide adequate Airport access. As noted previously, in 1987 Toronto Island Airport served about 400,000 passengers and had almost 200,000 aircraft movements (many of them touch-and-go training flights). The dramatic increase in passenger traffic is the result of the commercial success of STOL service.

In 1987, the ferry carried some 800,000 passengers and 37,600 vehicles. Ferry service, it is argued, severely limits the service that could be provided by the air carriers. For example, a study done for the THC by Acres International Ltd. projected that, in 1992, the Airport will serve 666,000 passengers if current access arrangements continue, but assumed that the number would increase to 1,267,000 if a tunnel connecting the Airport to the mainland replaced the ferry service.

The provincial government is particularly concerned about access arrangements because its payments to the THC for ferry service operating deficits increased from \$171,000 in 1978 to \$469,000 in 1987. The Province is also concerned that the 'Maple City' is reaching an age at which it will require increasingly expensive maintenance.

There was a range of opinions in the Work Group about the merits of a tunnel: some members argued for a vehicle and passenger tunnel, while others thought the existing ferry service should be maintained.

The Group recognizes that significant economic activity is generated by the Island Airport: more than 400 jobs — in three refuelling companies, two flight training firms, two avionics shops, and a general aviation maintenance shop, as well as in the air carriers themselves — exist in operations directly associated with it. About 750 medical emergency flights per year use the Airport. In 1987, the Airport generated some \$800,000 in revenues, against operating expenses of \$1,450,000.

In 1984, Transport Canada started a \$21 million capital expenditures program to improve facilities at TIA. The major projects are: a new air traffic control tower, a microwave landing system, an expanded terminal apron, improvements to the water and sanitary sewage systems, a new maintenance and



service building, and service road reconstruction. Transport Canada has also included \$4.5 million in its current five-year capital investment plan for a new passenger terminal. A new terminal is necessary to handle arriving and departing passengers more efficiently, especially if forecasted STOL demand meets current projections.

Members of the Work Group believe that capital improvements are necessary and could be completed within the framework of the current Tripartite Agreement.

Overall, members of the Group concluded that the Toronto Island Airport is an important economic entity, and is part of the working waterfront concept. It contributes to the diversity of commercial and general aviation opportunities; loss of the facility would result in considerable hardship for those who use it.

## ***4. Railway Lands***

The Railway Lands occupy about 81 hectares (200 acres) of land from Bathurst Street east to Yonge Street and from Front Street on the north to the Gardiner Expressway on the south. The area, which was created by lakefill in the mid-nineteenth century as railway companies penetrated the central core of the City, served as the site for the main tracks, the railway marshalling yards, Toronto's primary passenger terminal, and a roundhouse.

In the past two decades, ever since rail freight was moved north of Toronto, the Lands have been subject to considerable study. In that time, CN and Marathon Realty, the real estate arm of CP Railway, have proposed a number of massive redevelopment projects for the site. In 1968, the railway companies brought forward the Metro Centre Plan, which would have gradually replaced their marshalling yards with commercial and residential development. For a variety of reasons, this scheme was delayed and finally abandoned in 1975.

In the early 1980s, however, the railways, in conjunction with City of Toronto planning staff, formulated a new proposal. Known as the Railway Lands Plan, it provides for construction of about 1.4 million square metres (15 million square feet) of commercial space. The plan for the portion being redeveloped by CN Real Estate calls for office and commercial development



with associated retail and residential space. Marathon Realty is also proposing office, commercial, and retail projects and residential buildings.

The City of Toronto has said that its objectives in redeveloping the area are: to unite the Central City with the waterfront; to ensure land uses that both satisfy a broad range of needs and allow for effective transportation operations; to create a street-oriented development pattern; and to institute measures for a progressive implementation of development.

A novel method for ensuring the progressive implementation of development, to which the City and railway companies agreed, was the institutionalization of a holding or "H" designation. The H designation is a zoning procedure intended to regulate the incremental development of the Railway Lands over some 20 years. Development in each of the precincts, or zones, in the Railway Lands will be allowed to proceed when agreement has been secured on the availability of transportation, local amenities, and other Metro services.

## **Issues and Opportunities**

The Railway Lands proposals have not been without controversy. The latest round of negotiations involved some 200 public meetings and an Ontario Municipal Board hearing before the redevelopment plans were accepted. The issues at stake are substantial and varied. This is hardly surprising in an area in which housing components would bring in an estimated 15,000 new residents and office and commercial areas would bring in some 20,000–25,000 new jobs. This estimate excludes individuals who will travel into the area on a daily basis to transact business.

The economic impact of the redevelopment will be influenced by the enormous transportation demands for both people and freight implied by the Railway Lands Plan. Therefore, the question of the adequacy of the overall metropolitan transportation system to handle the expected movement of people and freight associated with the Railway Lands project was important to the Work Group. We recognize that the Royal Commission's Access and Movement Work Group is focusing on transportation, but our Group was concerned that the Plan's transportation requirements would adversely affect its economic performance.



Strong feelings have been expressed by people working in the Central Area that the existing and proposed transportation and parking infrastructure is, and will be, inadequate to cope with the proposed scale of development. Moreover, whatever office and residential development is proposed, the nearby SkyDome itself is incompatible with existing transportation facilities. To expect satisfactory transportation operations to depend primarily on pedestrian and public transit is incongruent with the reality of a public which will relinquish its love affair with the private automobile only reluctantly or not at all.

A number of transportation and parking studies have been completed on the proposed Railway Lands developments and show that the existing parking allowances meet zoning requirements for the area. Furthermore, some urban transportation officials believe it is possible to discourage people from driving downtown by making the urban transit system relatively more attractive than automobiles.

Regardless of the merits of this objective, there are people working within the existing and future urban-core commercial developments who will use automobile transportation on a daily basis. Similarly, consideration should be given to those who must come to the downtown to transact business. They, as well as those who provide goods and services to offices, residents, and commercial operations, cannot all be forced onto the public transit system.

Some people suggested to us that the transportation system, and public transit in particular, lacks sufficient capacity or an adequate route network to serve the Railway Lands and their immediately adjacent precincts. During the next phase of the Royal Commission's work, we suggest that the adequacy of transportation network facilities be examined in light of proposed waterfront development projects.

Another issue concerning our group is the adequacy of public services and neighbourhood amenities (such as schools, medical facilities, retail shopping outlets, parks, and open space) in the Railway Lands proposal. It appears that, as development proceeds, social and economic pressures may render the requirements for these services and amenities so acute that adjacent waterfront lands will have to be used to provide space for them. If waterfront lands are used for these purposes, the social and economic balances between them



may be altered or upset. We suggest that, in order to avoid the potential for encroachment onto adjacent waterfront lands, a review be undertaken to ensure adequate provision of schools, police and fire services, and other neighbourhood public amenities.

An opportunity exists to link the eastern edge of the Railway Lands with Union Station and the Canada Post site and adjacent parcels immediately to the south. Union Station would be the focus for an improved intermodal transportation terminus for the CN and CP, Via Rail, GO-Transit, TTC, and the inter-city bus carriers now located elsewhere. The development would be beneficial to the public because it would provide improved accessibility to a variety of transit modes, and it would reinforce policy aimed at increasing the use of public transit.

The lands in question, particularly the Canada Post parcel, are largely owned or controlled by public bodies and are essential to the project. We urge that the Royal Commission seek to have Canada Post, in its "Call for Expressions of Interest", include the intermodal transport terminus concept and the use of the air rights to provide offsetting revenues that may be required to make it profitable.

Further, we believe this opportunity is within the direct mandate of the Royal Commission because it involves the federal government and because the project would require working with other levels of government. Additional study is required to broaden this concept and to create an organization to undertake the development project.

The redevelopment of these lands and of the area on the north side of Front Street will be the major focus of economic growth in the next 10 to 20 years. The impact will be especially felt in the development and construction phases. In addition, there will be the effect of full-time job creation resulting from substantially increased residential and commercial development adjacent to the City's central core.

The Work Group urges that careful consideration be given to expanding support services — particularly transit, access, and parking — and to increasing the exhibition capacity of the Convention Centre for trade shows. The Group believes that the result would perhaps alter the need to invest in a new International Trade Centre (discussed on p. 49); perhaps such a facility could be developed at Exhibition Place, once a



transportation infrastructure is in place and other supporting amenities are available to encourage private-sector development.

The majority of the Work Group believes that the overall Railway Lands concept allows for a dynamic and exciting opportunity. Because the planning process is substantially advanced and, because of the sheer complexity of the project, any changes to the plan are considered to be difficult at this stage.

While the majority of the Group considers the Railway Lands a dynamic and exciting project, the minority view, however, is that the project abandons the vision of the City expressed in Toronto's Official Plan. This plan shows a city based on buildings of human-scale with adequate social services and recreational opportunities, free from traffic congestion and pollution. That is, "a City for *all* Toronto's citizens, not just as a preserve for the rich to enjoy and exploit". [Memo from the Commissioner of Planning and Development to the Land Use Committee, 28 November 1983, emphasis added.]

The Railway Lands project is a rejection of this vision and proposes, instead, a vast commercial development in the Central Area — one in which there are an enormous number of commuters travelling daily into the City, extremely high densities for expensive condominium housing, and an apparent lack of attention to neighbourhood amenities. Such commercial development also threatens to encroach on adjacent industrial lands, which could mean a continued loss of industrial employment in an area already hard-hit by plant closures.

The minority members in the Group urge the Royal Commission to recommend that the City consider carefully the project's phasing of construction. As the railway companies apply for removal of the holding designation for the various development precincts, the City should give particular attention, as indicated in the Ontario Municipal Board Report, to ensure that transportation facilities and sewer infrastructure are adequate and that environmental problems are satisfactorily resolved.


The City should also ensure that sufficient affordable and family housing is built and that proper amenities to service residential neighbourhoods are provided. According to current plans, the likelihood of meeting family housing goals seems remote, and the appropriate conditions and environment for such housing will be difficult to achieve.



## 5. Harbourfront<sup>4</sup>

In October 1972, 35 hectares (86 acres) of land, on the Central Waterfront (Map 6), were set aside by the Government of Canada as an urban park. A Crown corporation, commonly known as Harbourfront, was created and was charged with administering these lands for the citizens of Toronto. The government insisted its decision was intended to avert a new threat to the waterfront, the construction of a "ceramic curtain" of high-rise development that would alienate Torontonians from their waterfront.

The first five or six years of Harbourfront's efforts were marked by indecision and an apparent lack of direction. The Corporation was having difficulty fulfilling its mandate of developing an urban park and there were strained relations between politicians and Harbourfront planners. The Corporation's Board wrestled with various schemes — demolishing the old terminal warehouse and adjacent ice house; constructing a building the length of several football fields under the Gardiner Expressway to hold the records of one federal department — and sought to define the meaning and goals of the park. There were a few generally unsuccessful public participation planning programs, a number of attempts to produce a consensus on the objectives of development, and a couple of reorganizations of Harbourfront itself.



Map 6. Harbourfront Lands

4. This section uses material from Gene Desfor, Michael Goldrick, and Roy Merrens, "Redevelopment of the North American Water-frontier: The Case of Toronto" in B.S. Hoyle, D.A. Pinder, and M.S. Husain (eds.) *Revitalizing the Waterfront*, London, Belhaven Press, 1988.



After these tentative first years the organization of Harbourfront was transformed into a structure that would enable it to operate more effectively as a developer. In 1978, Harbourfront Corporation brought forward a general plan, *Development Framework*, favouring a mix of land uses with commercial and residential development set among a variety of recreational facilities. The acceptance of Harbourfront's 1978 strategy marked an about-face from an initial concept of developing an 'urban park' to a notion of extending the 'urban fabric' to the waterfront.

Financial self-sufficiency within seven years was a central objective of the 1978 development plan; a federal government grant was to pay for infrastructure improvements, while surplus revenues generated by development projects were to be used to pay for extensive arts, recreational, and cultural programming. As a result of expensive site preparation and infrastructure to support mixed-use development, and the possibility that a continuing operating subsidy might eventually cool the Government's enthusiasm, the Harbourfront staff suggested that financial self-sufficiency was an appropriate development strategy. This strategy has meant that long-term public assets have been traded for funding to meet current operating budgets — a dubious technique that jeopardizes the financial stability of local government agencies.

By the end of 1980, Harbourfront's new plan had been approved by the Government of Canada and the City of Toronto, in a special Master Agreement and development proceeded swiftly. In 1985 Harbourfront was estimated to have existing projects and future commitments totaling \$281.7 million and 267,300 square metres (2,877,129 square feet) of gross floor space. [Currie, Coopers & Lybrand. "The Need For and Economic Benefits of the Harbourfront Streetcar Line", 1985, Exhibit 3 and Appendix II.]

Programming of arts, recreational, and cultural events also grew rapidly. In 1986, for example, \$11 million were required to fund 4,000 public events. [*The Toronto Star*, 24 September 1987.]

By 1986, the rapid rate of new construction, the lack of parkland, the layout of the overall project, and the specific design of a number of buildings at Harbourfront had generated heated public controversy. In the spring of 1987, several tall narrow condominium buildings, which appeared to violate reasonable design standards and were thought to be cheap and ugly, were





*Ship building on Toronto's waterfront.*

Photo courtesy of City of Toronto Archives, G & M 80194.

the focus of concern. Widespread dismay was expressed at the loss of human-scale residential buildings sensitively sited to hide the Gardiner Expressway.

Some people wondered why it was necessary for Harbourfront to be so secretive about its financial dealings and arrangements with developers. While the chairperson of Harbourfront's Board of Directors insisted there was "too much green" on the site, critics deplored the developing "quay side concrete curtain". Underlying much of the detailed criticism, however, was a deep feeling that Harbourfront had betrayed its commitment to the public and that it was time to undertake a thorough review of what had happened and where development should go. Calls went out to make Harbourfront more accountable and to establish a more coherent vision for the overall site.

Both the Government of Canada and the City of Toronto undertook reviews of Harbourfront, and imposed interim measures (e.g., building freezes) as a temporary restriction on further development. In addition, Harbourfront reviewed its own recent development.

The Government of Canada began its review in April 1987, and commissioned Professor Gary Hack, an urban design professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to rechart a course for Harbourfront. In July 1987, he recommended:

1. that a new urban design plan be established to guide development;
2. that stronger procedures be put in place to guide and review development projects;
3. that a long-term plan be established for cultural activities and public programming at Harbourfront.

The City began its review in February 1987 and also reported in July that a new Harbourfront plan should meet the following objectives:

1. to provide all possible vehicular, pedestrian, and visual connections between the Railway Lands project and Harbourfront;
2. to plan for a zone of predominantly public open space south of Queen's Quay, and a zone intended primarily for development, to be configured as city blocks, north of Queen's Quay;



3. to include an open space system that permits unhindered access to Lake Ontario and includes 16.2 hectares (40 acres) of public park space that are linked together and clearly intended for year round public use.

Harbourfront's own review panel was headed by architect George Baird, and it produced a new plan, *Harbourfront 2000*, that identified three basic design principles: a high-quality open-space system; a grand waterfront boulevard; and distinctive architecture for individual buildings. Harbourfront's concept of an open-space system differed markedly from the City's: the Corporation conceived of its open space system as part of an urban experience, rather than a pastoral one. As Harbourfront needs to attract visitors all year round, it contended that its design for a sequence of open spaces made allowances for the cold and windy climate during a significant portion of the year. It argued that more conventional parks were available at other waterfront sites (e.g., Toronto Islands), and that Toronto's harsh and exposed lakefront environment was not conducive to year-round activities.

The differences between Harbourfront's concept of open space and that of the City, as well as their conflicting methods for measuring park land, led to sharp disagreements between them. Throughout much of 1988, the battle between the City and Harbourfront continued and, in February of that year, City Council imposed an interim by-law that froze development. City politicians criticized Harbourfront for failing to live up to its promise to provide the City with 16.2 hectares (40 acres) of park space.

In August, City Council and Harbourfront staff proposed that the Corporation transfer the open space in two phases: 13 hectares (32 acres) immediately and 3.2 hectares (8 acres) to be agreed upon at a later date. However, the proposal was not acceptable to the Harbourfront Board of Directors and it was not adopted. In response, City Council extended the interim development freeze for another six months, to June 1989. Discussions are under way to resolve the problem and put an end to the impasse.

Although the building freeze has halted new construction, Harbourfront activities continue to have a considerable economic impact; this was estimated in a Harbourfront publication, *Harbourfront: Toronto's Waterfront Vision*, and is summarized in Table 8.



**TABLE 8: Direct Economic Impacts  
of Harbourfront**

	1986/87	1991/92
Employment *	2,850	8,890
Personal Income Generated	\$56,754,900	\$172,500,000
Personal Income Tax	\$6,785,100	\$20,500,000
Residential/Commercial Assessment	\$24,350,000	\$72,000,000
Property Tax	\$8,050,000	\$24,200,000
Attendance	3,000,000	10,762,400
Visitor Expenditure **	\$42,000,000	\$161,436,000

\* Does not include those involved in the production of cultural activities, but does include Harbourfront Corporation employees

\*\* Based on survey information, summer 1985. [\$12/Attendee (1986) — \$15/Attendee (1991/92)]

Source: Harbourfront Corporation. *Harbourfront: Toronto's Waterfront Vision*, Toronto: Harbourfront Corporation, 1987.



Harbourfront Corporation's objective of financial self-sufficiency has received considerable attention. The goal, it should be noted, was accepted during a particularly devastating economic period, making the strategy appear more desirable than it would have in more expansionary times, and it led Harbourfront to undertake development projects it might otherwise not have accepted.

The objective of self-sufficiency gave rise to a funding and operating framework that accorded the Harbourfront Corporation considerable autonomy and made it formally accountable only to the Minister of Public Works in Ottawa. As long as Harbourfront was operating to achieve self-sufficiency, the government seems to have been content to let the Corporation manage its own affairs; furthermore, the Corporation was not accountable for its programming and development activities under a multiple-level review process.

The lack of detailed review created an environment in which Harbourfront Corporation's Board of Directors focused on achieving its corporate financial objectives and became insensitive and unresponsive to its public responsibilities. The importance of the issue leads the Work Group to suggest that development of proper financial protocols to budget, account for, and analyse initiatives at the local government level, should be undertaken.


## ***6. Central Bayfront***

The Central Bayfront is that portion of the waterfront directly south of Toronto's downtown core (Map 7). It lies on land created by lakefilling operations begun in the nineteenth century to meet the demand of the railway companies for more land, and continued in this century in response to demands for increased port facilities and industrial sites. The current shoreline is more than three-quarters of a kilometre south of its original Front Street location. Some sense of the amount of land which has been created by lakefill can be gained from recalling that the THC building, now tucked in among a network of roadways well north of Harbourfront, was once on the water's edge.

The City of Toronto viewed the Central Bayfront as that area where "the central city will be built southwards to the lake". It is strategically located between Yonge and York Streets, and its



proximity to downtown has given the area enormous potential for development. The City envisioned that the Central Bayfront would be the site of new commercial and residential developments, and improved pedestrian and vehicular transportation facilities to help revitalize the area. The Central Bayfront was also to provide space for expansion of the financial district and a new open-space system to link downtown Toronto with the lake.



*Map 7. Toronto's Central Waterfront*

The redevelopment potential of the Central Bayfront became obvious in 1962 when the Toronto Star purchased the site of its present building. In the same year, the City of Toronto and the Toronto Harbour Commissioners entered into an agreement with Marvo Corporation to redevelop the site across the street from the Star building vacated by Canada Steamship Lines.

Since that time, two massive buildings have been constructed, the Toronto Star head office and Harbour Square Hotel and condominiums. Four other projects are in various stages of development, the World Trade Centre, Waterpark Place (Phases 1 and 11), One York Quay, and Marine Terminal 27.



Construction has begun on the World Trade Centre, a project which will occupy 3 hectares (7.5 acres) in prime Central Bayfront land and cost \$40 million. Announced in 1984, it was approved by City Council in December 1986. York Hanover Company and Camrost Development Corporation are the principal developers of the project, which consists of three office towers, of 27-37 storeys high with an estimated combined gross floor area of 161,000 square metres (1.7 million square feet), and two residential towers of luxury condominiums. The condo buildings will be 25 and 32 storeys high with a total gross floor area of 66,000 square metres (700,000 square feet). There will also be several low-rise buildings that connect the towers.

The first phase of Waterpark Place, a 26-storey office building, opened in September 1986. The second phase, recently begun, will be an 18-storey office tower with a total of 26,700 square metres (282,000 square feet) of gross floor space and a glass-domed shopping mall that will connect the two buildings. Two condominium towers west of the office buildings are scheduled for later phases.

The land on which One York Quay is being constructed was purchased by Graywood Developments Ltd. in February 1987, from Campeau Corporation Ltd. The land had been part of a three-way agreement, originally signed in 1962 by the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, the City of Toronto, and Marvo Construction Co. (Campeau Corporation later assumed Marvo's rights.) The project consists of two residential towers of condominiums, of 38 and 39 storeys. The City initially approved 487 residential units in the project, but Graywood later applied for and was granted approval for an additional 325, for a total of 812 units.

The fourth project is known by the name of the building that once stood on the site: Marine Terminal 27. The site, purchased in 1987, from the Toronto Harbour Commissioners by Avro Corporation for \$24 million, consists of almost 3.6 hectares (9 acres) of land on the water's edge. No plans have been announced for its development, but a mixed commercial-residential project is expected.

With the completion of these four projects, the Central Bayfront will be almost totally redeveloped, except for two potentially important sites: the Ontario Provincial Police land at 90 Harbour Street, and 8 York Street. A 5-storey OPP



headquarters building and central garage are located on approximately 1 hectare (2.5 acres); the OPP are scheduled to leave the property at the end of 1991 and relocate in Brampton.

Number 8 York Street, formerly Ontario Welcome House, is owned by Harbourfront Corporation. It is a strategically located parcel of land on the west site of York Street, and Harbourfront plans to develop commercial activity on the site in buildings about 15 storeys high.

When the OPP do relocate, their site at 90 Harbour Street will represent an important redevelopment opportunity. It has good, though sometimes congested, access to the Gardiner Expressway and a restricted view of the Lake. The Gardiner Expressway, the exit ramps and associated traffic make the immediate surroundings of the site fairly unpleasant for pedestrians, and we suggest it would be unsuitable for family residential use. The site could, however, possibly be used for commercial office space or luxury condominiums.


In 1987, the value of the property was estimated at \$15.4 million according to the then current zoning. This estimated value could increase to as much as \$36.7 million if a full commercial redevelopment option could be achieved. [Comay Planning Consultants, 1987, *Report One*, p. 21.]

Two major issues arise from developments in the Central Bayfront. First, extending the Central Business District south to the lakeshore was done outside any comprehensive development policy for the waterfront. The Central Bayfront was treated like an extension of the business district while wider regional interests were ignored. The density of buildings under construction in the area is overwhelming, alienating people from this Central Waterfront space. Furthermore, the actual design of the buildings frequently obstructs views of the lake and contributes to a feeling of estrangement from the water's edge.

The second issue concerns such projects as Harbour Square, the Toronto Star Building, Marine Terminal 27, and two condo towers at the World Trade Centre. These projects were undertaken at the cost of selling publicly-owned land to the private sector — land that will probably never return to public ownership following the current cycle of redevelopment.



Such sales of prime waterfront lands into private hands are undesirable, even if the developments are part of a well conceived and integrated plan. Moreover, that kind of transaction is still possible, despite public announcements to the contrary. In this regard, it is instructive to recall the complex arrangements involving the City of Toronto, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners and Dover Elevator Company.



Source: Province of Ontario, Metro Toronto Property Review, Report 4, March 1982.

*Map 8. Toronto's East Bayfront*

## 7. East Bayfront

### Current Plans and Issues

The East Bayfront (Map 8) lies between high-density commercial and residential redevelopments to the west and the port industrial lands to the east. The St. Lawrence housing developments are located north of the site.

Large-scale redevelopment expansion from the urban core has already reached the waterfront in the Central Bayfront area, and market forces seem to be looking east to capitalize on a nearby lakefront location. Suggestions have been made that land values in the East Bayfront will support only intensive commercial or residential uses. The East Bayfront however, has a long tradition as the location of water-dependent and water-related industrial activity — a tradition recognized by public policy designations of the area as industrial.



The battle to keep the East Bayfront industrial has already been joined, but its outcome is far from certain. Public policy during the current wave of redevelopment could have a substantial impact on either the transition to commercial and residential uses of the East Bayfront or on its maintenance as an industrial area. In 1988, employment in the area was estimated at 2,731 jobs by Metro Toronto's Planning Department, but the potential exists to generate significantly more employment.

Land-use activities on the East Bayfront are being influenced by the more than 15 public and private landowners in the area. The ownership pattern, the size of individual holdings, the financial needs of the owners, as well as the general political environment are critical in determining the outcome of the struggle between market-driven forces and a policy-driven solution.

Principal landowners include the Province of Ontario (through their agencies, the Liquor Control Board of Ontario and the Ontario Provincial Police), the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, major existing industrial operators (Redpath Sugars Limited, Victory Soya Mills Limited, Canada Malting Company Limited, Charles Abel, etc.) and the owners of the former Canron heavy industrial site, now unused.

Land-use activities on the East Bayfront will also be influenced by a variety of sources from outside the area. For example, if the type of development that exists in the Central Bayfront moves eastward, landowners will want to capitalize on the significant potential for office and commercial development. The Toronto Star, whose building lies on the area's western boundary and houses a mixture of newspaper production and office facilities, had been considering expanding to adjacent sites or relocating entirely. Apparently expansion plans are not currently being considered, but relocating the newspaper manufacturing plant to a suburban site is a possibility.

The newspaper production portion of the building has considerable influence on the industrial character of the area and redevelopment of the Star building would have a substantial impact on the East Bayfront. Neighbourhoods to the north may bring pressure on public authorities to exclude industrial activity, which they deem "unacceptable", from the area, as the result of truck traffic, noise, unpleasant odours and/or dust.



This section of the Work Group's report reviews the major issues surrounding the struggle for the East Bayfront. Because these issues are particularly complicated, the organization of this section is highlighted. We examine three principal groups which significantly influence the ongoing battle: governments and governmental agencies, housing proponents and the private sector. We look first at policies suggested by the municipal and Metro Toronto governments, the provincial housing ministry and the plans of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners. We then turn to examine the influence of those who favour housing in the East Bayfront. Finally, we describe the interests of large private-sector landowners in the area. In the final part of this section, we present a number of recommendations for the East Bayfront.

The City of Toronto has identified the East Bayfront as an area for industrial activity. City Council recently adopted an amendment to the Official Plan for the Central Waterfront, which states that, "Council supports and encourages a continuing and expanded industrial role for the Port Industrial District (and) the East Bayfront...". [City of Toronto. *Official Plan Amendment for the Central Waterfront*, 1978, Section 5A.15.] A further policy statement comments that:

The East Bayfront is a viable industrial district which shall remain in industrial use. The City shall encourage and assist the intensification of industrial uses, including ancillary commercial and institutional uses as appropriate, on currently under-used land where such intensification, in Council's opinion, will not have an adverse environmental impact on nearby residential area.

[*ibid*, Section 5A.31.]

There are new zoning by-laws to implement the policies enunciated in the Central Waterfront Plan. One of the major changes is to down-zone the East Bayfront, which reduces the maximum size of buildings permitted in the area. East Bayfront buildings are now permitted to have a total floor space area of up to three times their lot size, rather than the seven to twelve times the lot size previously allowed. The lower density means that the maximum revenue-generating potential of a lot may be reduced with the reduction in total permissible floor space. The objective of this policy, as indicated by City planning statements, is to maintain the scale of building appropriate for industry.



The new zoning by-law also identifies permitted land uses for the area: electronic equipment production, computer services and maintenance, training schools, and a range of business services. [City of Toronto, *Land-Use Committee Report No. 19*.] If existing industrial by-law uses are permitted to continue (data processing, duplicating, workshops and studios, communications, miscellaneous light manufacturing, etc.), second-generation industrial activity could be combined with existing industry for a significantly increased intensification of land uses.

According to the City's Central Waterfront Official Plan Amendment, housing is not a permitted use in the East Bayfront. Although preliminary planning documents indicate that residential development had been considered, the City's plan includes a policy of prohibiting residential development and directed that the East Bayfront be maintained for industrial use. Controls on the amount of ancillary commercial development were also instituted to minimize development pressures that would "undermine the primary land use objective for the East Bayfront... to promote redevelopment for light industrial uses in accordance with the City's economic development policies". [City of Toronto, *Planning and Development Report to Land Use Committee*, April 25 1983, p. 13.]

A final decision on the City's Central Waterfront Official Plan Amendment and implementing zoning by-laws has not been reached. Although City Council has adopted these plans, private landowners have referred them to the Ontario Municipal Board for review. Owners of redevelopment sites, hoping to maximize their investments, object to the down-zoning and other policy restrictions on the type of development permitted by the revised Official Plan.

Metropolitan Toronto is currently reviewing its Official Plan, which deals with the place of industry in the Metropolitan area, and contains a general provision that "Council shall attempt to increase job opportunities in designated industrial areas... [and] that Council supports policies to limit the intrusion of incompatible or competitive uses recognizing some may be appropriated." [Metropolitan Toronto, *Official Plan*, Section 3E.] A background document prepared for the review includes the East Bayfront in one of its industrial zones, the Toronto Central Area-Waterfront Industrial Area. While no



specific recommendations are submitted for the East Bayfront, the study recognizes the need to assess future land use in light of the change in industrial activity in Metropolitan Toronto.

Metro has recently adopted an economic development strategy that should have a bearing on waterfront industry in general, and on the East Bayfront in particular. Briefly, Metro's Economic Development Strategy is based on a series of principles that focus on (a) the trade sectors of Metropolitan Toronto's economy, (b) growth and development of large and innovative enterprises, (c) an international outlook for Metro Toronto and its business community, and (d) a regional perspective and emphasis on targeted, leveraging, and catalyst activities. From these principles, a strategy was formulated which relied on cooperation and planning by key leaders in business, education, the labour movement and government.

Metro would like to pursue new industrial growth partnerships, attract the head offices of large corporations, attract research and development firms, establish significant infrastructure programs, and work for better federal and provincial policies in support of Metro business. If Metro is to be successful, it will have to assess all available sites suitable for business or industrial use. Obviously, the East Bayfront is one such area.

In addition to the City and Metro, the Province of Ontario is directly involved in the East Bayfront. The Province's generally significant jurisdictional responsibilities on the waterfront are heightened in the East Bayfront by its ownership of the 6.3 hectares (15.5 acres) of land currently occupied by the LCBO and the OPP. The Province has stated that it has a policy for its lands when they become available for re-use, which stipulates that residential uses should be given priority. This housing-first policy is relevant to the East Bayfront, because of the real possibility that the LCBO and OPP sites will soon become available. The Work Group's recommendations for these particular lands are discussed in detail in the next section of this Report.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners, an agency of the Government of Canada, has a long tradition of developing land for industrial uses on the waterfront. Although significant portions of its original landholdings on the East Bayfront have been sold, the THC still owns valuable water's edge property on the Queen Elizabeth docks, the site of Marine Terminals 28 and 29.



The THC has formulated a conceptual development plan that calls for "Transitional Industrial" uses for this area; this term appears to be a rather general category, which provides the THC with a good deal of flexibility so that it can respond to prevailing market conditions. The concept plan designates the area for offices, retail, and parking structures, but the category also includes business, industrial or research and development activities, all of which are included in plans for other "Transitional Industrial" areas.

The dire housing situation in the Metropolitan Toronto area has caused many groups and government agencies to recommend residential use of almost any land that becomes available, and some groups have viewed the East Bayfront as a natural site for extending existing neighbourhoods that lie to the north. Some municipal and provincial government groups are urging southward expansion of residential uses into the East Bayfront; the report to the Royal Commission by the Housing and Neighbourhoods Work Group suggested this move.

Recently the City of Toronto and the Province of Ontario announced a joint project to construct a large housing development, St. Lawrence Square, just northeast of the East Bayfront.

Existing private-sector industries remain concerned, as they have been for some time, about their long-term future in the East Bayfront. They want a clear and unambiguous statement from the City about its intentions in the area. Five major manufacturers have already banded together to form an organization, the South East Toronto Industrial Awareness Organization (SETIAO), to represent the interests of industry in the southeastern part of Toronto, and particularly in the East Bayfront area and the Port Industrial District. The organization was founded by Redpath Sugars Limited, Lever Brothers Ltd., Victoria Soya Mills, Colgate-Palmolive Canada, and Baines and David Steel. According to SETIAO's recent statement "...we're not going to stand by and have anyone plan us out of existence". [Tom Chandler, submission to the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 11 May 1989, p. 2.]

The industries that make up SETIAO claim they will not move from their present locations and are committed to the industrial integrity of southeast Toronto. SETIAO's founding members employ about 1,600 people and contribute in excess of \$55 million annually to the local economy through the





*The Maple Leaf Mills grain elevators have been razed, but they once stood on Harbourfront land.*

Photo courtesy of Toronto Harbour Commission Archives, PC 1/1/8219.

purchase of goods and services. The organization wants the East Bayfront to be maintained with a "legitimate industrial environment," [ibid, p. 6.] which means no housing.

Details of the plans being contemplated by various owners in the East Bayfront are sketchy and uncertain. Most are awaiting the outcome of the Ontario Municipal Board hearings regarding the City's recently adopted City Official Plan. SETIAO claims that investments worth \$50 million are currently on hold by its members. Parcels on the north side of Queen's Quay East, between Jarvis and Parliament Streets, are being held for future redevelopment.

Some landowners, concerned about down-zoning, have indicated that development opportunities on these lands may not have been entirely lost. The old Canadian Iron Foundries Limited property on the south side of Lakeshore Boulevard East has recently been sold. The new owners of that former heavy-industry site, the Waterfront Land Corporation, announced recently that they intend to use it for "hi-tech industries, a communications centre, waterfront studios, and an automotive supercentre... a waterfront restaurant and marine related uses". [*The Toronto Star*, 30 December 1988.] Redevelopment of this site offers significant potential at a strategic edge between the East Bayfront and the Port Industrial District. (Because the site is held privately, the Work Group has not included it in the section devoted to new opportunities. Nevertheless, it certainly offers an enormous potential for employment generation and should be considered as a locale for industrial activity.)

The Work Group concludes that the East Bayfront should be retained for industrial activity. Policies directed at encouraging investment and reinvestment in second-generation industry should be confirmed and implemented. These policies should be rigorously followed so that industry is encouraged to invest and reinvest, to maintain modern and competitive production processes, and to achieve objectives for creating and retaining jobs.

Therefore, proposals to introduce housing into the East Bayfront should be rejected as creating disincentives to industrial investment. To rectify the imbalance created by the Government of Ontario's housing-first policy, we urge the Province to adopt a long-term industrial strategy and to focus on retaining and improving employment-generating activity on their East Bayfront lands.



## New Opportunities

Three existing port-related industries located in the East Bayfront are identified by the Work Group as indicators of a healthy working waterfront: Redpath Sugars Limited, Victory Soya Mills and Canada Malting Company Limited. Each has substantial capital investments in its property and each represents a good traditional manufacturing base. Their operations provide import and export opportunities for agriculture and food processing related products, and they rely on transportation through the Port of Toronto.

The Work Group recommends that these port industries be encouraged to remain at their present locations and that efforts be made to assist them to do so.

This recommendation is made despite escalating land values, fixed costs, and possible problems with surrounding neighbours. Certainly, these industrial companies are sensitive to the significantly increased values on the East Bayfront, and appreciate the impact those values would have if they chose to redevelop or sell their lands. Each company owns the majority of its property, and Redpath Sugars has title to virtually all of its lands except a small piece that it leases from the THC.

Intensified industrial development can (and should) be designed to be compatible with existing industry. As previously noted, there is now an organization, the South East Toronto Industrial Awareness Organization, which is actively promoting industry on the East Bayfront. SETIAO will be involved in determining the future of the area, and it should be a party to discussions regarding adjacent land uses. These discussions should be based on the premise that the industries should be on the waterfront as long as they choose.

Industries need to be assured that there is support for their secure existence before new or continued capital investment in a facility will be made. We urge action that will provide these assurances.

In the event that existing East Bayfront companies close their operations or relocate, second-generation industries should be located on these lands.

In addition to supporting existing port-related industries on the East Bayfront, the Work Group identified a number of new opportunities for employment-generating activities there. The



landholdings by the Province and the THC offer a potential for development that would support significant job creation objectives and an enhanced role in Toronto for new second-generation industrial opportunities. These large landholdings offer the potential of cross-subsidization (that is, highly profitable activities on one plot of land could be used to subsidize activities on adjacent sites). Development opportunities for a variety of second-generation industries and business services can capitalize on the area's being located adjacent to the downtown core. Such adaptive re-industrialization is a challenge which should be pursued. Conventional office or commercial style development is not appropriate for this section of the waterfront.

According to a study for the Ontario Ministry of Government Services, the OPP and LCBO lands, shown shaded on Map 8, had an estimated 1987 market value of \$55 million if they were used for quasi-commercial activities. The Jobs, Opportunities, and Economic Growth Work Group has been led to understand that a decision has been made to relocate the entire OPP operation elsewhere in the not-too-distant future. The OPP's 1.6 hectares (4 acres) will then be available for redevelopment. If the LCBO parking lot immediately west of the OPP parking were relocated and incorporated into the redevelopment, a total of approximately 3.6 hectares (9 acres) would be available.

Generally 54 square metres are calculated for each employee in traditional industrial mall-type densities, and 25 square metres per employee are allowed in densities similar to the technical services opportunities incorporated in second-generation industrial activity and business services. Assuming a net development area of approximately 3.2 hectares (8 acres), at a density of three times coverage and an industrial employment ratio of from 50 to 25 square metres per employee, development of the LCBO site offers a potential of from 1,942 to 3,885 jobs. It is of sufficient size to offer the economies of scale to make a variety of industrial and business service spaces profitable.

The LCBO also occupies a site of more than 2.4 hectares (6 acres) on the west side of Cooper Street. The northern part of the site is used for LCBO offices, laboratories, bottling plant and a warehouse, while the southern section is an LCBO retail outlet and a parking lot. The availability of the entire site for



redevelopment depends upon the LCBO's relocation plans. The Work Group understands that the redevelopment potential of both the northern and southern sections of the LCBO site have been reviewed by the Province.

While the Group does not recommend relocation and the subsequent loss of the 550 employees, we are aware that the site offers job creation potential similar to that of the OPP site: an opportunity for second-generation industry and a potential adaptive re-use of existing structures.

Housing also has been suggested for the LCBO and OPP sites. The Province's housing-first policy, if applied to the LCBO lands, would mean loss of an important opportunity for significant employment creation. However serious the housing situation, housing initiatives, nevertheless, must be balanced with employment needs: just as a person needs an affordable place to live, he or she needs a well-paying job within a reasonable distance of home.

If the Province were to decide on the of use the site solely on the basis of the highest returns it could receive, it would be using a very narrow method of defining a socially optimal land use. The LCBO and OPP properties offer the Province an opportunity to work towards meeting the goals it outlined in the Report of the Premier's Council, *Competing in the New Global Economy*. [Ontario. Premier's Council, March 1988.] Further, the redevelopment of these properties would give the Province the chance to cooperate with Metropolitan Toronto and the City of Toronto to support their respective economic development goals.

For all these reasons, we urge the Province not to abandon the opportunity for reinvestment in these properties and to support second-generation industry.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners own approximately 8.9 hectares (22 acres) on the south side of Queen's Quay East, known as Marine Terminals 28 and 29 (Map 8). The THC's Concept Plan for the future of this parcel calls for development of transitional industrial uses on the major portion of the property. Assuming similar multipliers as above, a net development area of approximately 8.1 hectares (20 acres), at a density of three times coverage and an industrial employment ratio of from 50 to 25 square metres per employee, means that



redevelopment offers a potential for 4,860 to 9,720 jobs. This estimate does not include the lands currently leased to Redpath Sugars immediately adjacent to the Jarvis Street Slip.

While redevelopment of Marine Terminals 28 and 29 may dislocate some existing industry on the property, the potential exists to relocate these operations in the Port Industrial District or to accommodate them within the redevelopment of this property.

## **8. Port Industrial District**

### **Current Plans and Issues**

The Port Industrial District (Map 9) comprises approximately 370 hectares (917 acres) of land created by infilling in Ashbridge's Bay between 1912 and the 1930s. The Toronto Harbour Commissioners undertook the massive work as part of its visionary 1912 Plan to improve the Port and to create lands for industry, commerce, and recreational activity. Edward L. Cousins, the commission's Chief Engineer for many years and one of the principal architects of the 1912 Plan, provided the following rationale for the THC's vision:

...it should be borne in mind that the Harbour Commissioners' original development plan was founded not so much on increased harbour dues or revenue from Great Lakes tonnage as from the general benefit that would accrue to the City as a whole as a result of the increased industrial and commercial growth following the development of the harbour properties. In other words, no body of businessmen could have justified recommending the expenditure of \$25,000,000 on Toronto's water-borne tonnage offered then or in the near future in and out of Toronto Harbour.

[Edward L. Cousins, 24 June 1929, Toronto Harbour Commission Archives, RG 3/3, 1760-G-2, vol. 1, quoted in Roy Merrens, "Port Authorities as Urban Land Developers: The Case of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners and Their Outer Harbour Project, 1912-68", *Urban History Review*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Oct. 1988, p. 96.]



The subject of this section of the Work Group's report is the Port Industrial District lands created by the Harbour Commissioners. In particular, we will examine what Cousins referred to as "the general benefit....[that] accrue[d] to the City as a whole as a result of the increased industrial and commercial growth". As Cousins would have appreciated, our Work Group distinguishes the Port Industrial District from the Port of Toronto. The Port itself is the subject of discussion in the following section.



Map 9. Toronto's Port Industrial District

The Port Industrial District is a major resource of the economy of the Toronto region. In 1988, it was estimated to represent 40 per cent of the lands zoned for industrial use in the City of Toronto. [City of Toronto, Planning and Development Department. *Report to the Land Use Committee*, 25 April 1988.] Over the

years, the area has played host to many industries, including ship building and repairing, petroleum processing and storing, iron foundries, cement production, coal storage, salt storage, electricity generation, paper reprocessing, rail and truck transporting facilities, sewage treatment, waste disposal, business services, etc. In 1986, 4,185 jobs were estimated to exist in the area by the Metro Toronto Planning Department; however, we received suggestions that potential industrial opportunities could generate employment for 25,000 to more than 70,000 persons.

Heavy industry in the area, including some plants that would not be welcomed in other parts of the City because of their open storage of production materials, is often land-intensive. Large amounts of land relative to the number of people employed or relative to the value of their output are often required for the production processes of these open storage plants. This has led to a low ratio of employment per square metre compared with some other employment areas.

However, many of these industries provide important services to the City or to other manufacturing establishments. For example, aggregate, cement, and machinery are shipped in for construction and manufacturing industries; salt for winter road maintenance is brought in by ship, stored in and distributed from the area.

Many previous studies, such as those done by the City of Toronto's Port Industry Task Force (1975), and Port Industrial Development Task Force (1980), academic researchers, community groups, and professional associations have examined the future use of the Port Industrial District lands and searched for methods to attract and encourage development in the area. Major issues identified in these studies raise questions that were also fundamental to the Work Group's deliberation. For example, what should be done with the lands? Is there a need for industry? What kind of industrial employment should be encouraged? What, if any, competing uses should be permitted in the area? What are the compelling difficulties that need to be addressed before development can proceed? What type of infrastructure is required, or needs improvement, in order to facilitate industrial location? How many — and which — lands should be reserved for the Port and Port-related industry? What should be done to improve the aesthetic and visual attractiveness of the area? How can these improvements



be accomplished? What safeguards are needed to protect the environment? Should lands held by public agencies be leased or sold? How can the planning process be improved to cope with the changes on the waterfront?

In addition to the earlier studies, more recent reports and plans for the area have been published, including the City of Toronto's Official Plan Amendment for the Central Waterfront, Metropolitan Toronto's Official Plan review and supporting documents, the Toronto Harbour Commissioner's Concept Plan, *Bold Concept II*, and the Toronto Ontario Olympic Council's plans.

The City of Toronto's Central Waterfront Official Plan Amendment identifies the Port Industrial District as a chief industrial area. The plan's objectives for the industrial area are: "to promote the redevelopment of the underutilized lands ...for cleaner, more contemporary and environmentally sound industrial uses; to introduce a broader range of retail uses in order to improve the image and amenity of the area; to recognize and enhance its open space and recreational potential; and to promote higher standards of design and landscaping." [City of Toronto, Planning and Development Department. *Report to Land Use Committee*, 25 April 1988, p. 13.]

According to this plan, the area should contain the region's port facilities and dockwalls and parks and recreational areas along the north shore of the Outer Harbour, as well as lands for the relocation and expansion of existing City industries. It should also include, in well-defined areas, those industries requiring open storage of raw materials, public access to the water's edge, and a variety of local and retail uses along designated streets.

Another prominent feature of the plan is the inclusion of land for industry, but only industry which the City considers compatible with its surroundings. The maximum size of industrial buildings is determined by the ratio of total floor space to lot size — in the Port Industrial District, this ratio is between 1.0 and 3.0.

Some commercial development is allowed, but the total amount is restricted in order to limit market-oriented pressure on industrial land. The plan also stipulates that residential development should not be permitted. Through this plan, the



City introduced policies to improve the attractiveness of the area, including reduction in the size of some of the heavy industrial areas and limitations on activities that generate dust.

The Metropolitan Toronto Official Plan, like the City Plan discussed above, also refers to the Port Industrial District. Although currently under review, it clearly expresses a desire to increase industrial job opportunities. The primary objective of the policy as it relates to industrial lands has been summarized as being:


to ensure that the relatively limited supply of designated industrial land is used mainly to accommodate future industrial employment by protecting industrial lands for industry, limiting the development of non-industrial uses and limiting the amount of industrial land redesignated to other uses. [*Metropolitan Toronto, Metropolitan Toronto Plan Review*, Volume 5, 1988, p. 7.]

Other objectives include maintaining industrial land adequate to generate 45,000 additional jobs between 1976 and 2000. The plan expresses concern for the continued viability of industrial lands, and identifies areas that should be used specifically for industry because they are well situated in relation to rail lines, public transit, expressways, airports, or the harbour and the Port. It also supports policies that limit the intrusion of incompatible or competitive uses in industrial areas. It recommends that Metro Council embrace plans and policies at the municipal level that protect the integrity of industrial lands. [*Metropolitan Toronto Official Plan*, 1980, Section 3E.]

Reports for Metro Toronto's Official Plan review refer to the changing nature of the Port Industrial District and indicate the existence of significant opportunities for redevelopment. They draw attention to a need to support the industrial function of the Port area and to retain sufficient lands to meet Port users' needs. [*ibid*, pp. 95, 119.] The reports acknowledge Metro Toronto's interest in the area and its need to undertake further detailed studies to define its plans.

The essential points of the plan review study are Metro's findings that land uses are changing in the Port Industrial District, that port-related activities have declined, and that the area has had difficulties competing for development.





*Map 10. Toronto Harbour Commissioners Port Industrial Area Concept Plan*

As mentioned previously, Metro Toronto has recently adopted an Economic Development Strategy (see "East Bayfront" section of this Report). In brief, it calls for Metro to attract high value-added industries that are competitive in the world marketplace. The Port Industrial District is a land area that could be central to Metro Toronto's implementation of its Economic Development Strategy.

The THC released its new plan for the Port Industrial District in 1988. The Concept Plan (Map 10) was formulated by the THC after discussions with other landowners, with tenants, and with government representatives. It followed an assessment of the Commissioners' own institutional requirements and included all lands in the Port Industrial District in a



three-phase, 20-year implementation process. The intent of the THC plan is to provide for current and future needs of Port users, strengthen public access to and enjoyment of the Port area, and foster economic development. [*Port News*, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 8.]

The plan is extensive and includes a system of improvements to existing transportation connections to the waterfront, additional recreational projects, and an open-space system linking the Eastern Beaches with areas to the west and north. As well, Cherry Beach Waterfront Park is expanded, increasing public access to the Outer Harbour area, and a subdivision plan is proposed for a teleport located at the base of Leslie Street. The plan also includes retaining the Commissioners Street industrial area and developing new industrial and business parks as a means of promoting economic growth. (Recently, the business park idea has been the subject of attention with the apparent failure of the City of Toronto and the Toronto Harbour Commissioners to complete a deal for relocating Dover Elevator Company as the first tenant in the development project.) Because the District has a mixture of land-tenure systems, with varying terms and levels of investment, the plan proposes interim uses for lands with long-term leases and calls for flexible arrangements to secure the plan's implementation.

Incorporated into the plan is the THC scheme to develop a 1,200 slip-marina at the foot of Leslie Street. Together with marine-related commercial uses, the marina meets the THC's perception of a need for recreational boating facilities on the Toronto waterfront.

Two other plans have been presented for the Port Industrial District. The first, prepared by the Toronto Ontario Olympic Council (TOOC), is Toronto's bid for the 1996 Olympic games; it utilizes the waterfront to showcase many sporting events and to house international athletes. According to a recently published concept plan, an "Island of Peace", an "Olympic Village", a building for various swimming events, and rowing facilities are to be located in the Port Industrial District, but discussions continue about TOOC's final submissions, and its plans for the Port Industrial District may change. However, published plans conflict with the area's current industrial focus and implementing them may be more expensive than originally estimated, because of serious environmental problems.



The other plan, *Bold Concept II*, was commissioned by the Province of Ontario and authored by Jack Jones, a former Chief Engineer with the THC. It proposes Harbour Village, a new residential development, as well as resort and leisure activities for the Port Industrial District. The plan consolidates Port activities in a relatively small area in the southwest corner of the District. This conflicts with the objectives of the THC, the City of Toronto, and Metro Toronto because it does not maintain or enhance a strong industrial presence in the area.

The Work Group considered a number of major issues related to the Port Industrial District arising from the various proposed plans. One fundamental consideration is that of appropriate land uses in the Port Industrial District, and it is clear that the various schemes do not include a unified idea of what those uses should be. Many recognize the need for industry, but they do not agree on the relative importance of heavy or light industry and the extent to which commercial or retail activities should be permitted. Others propose housing and relegateing industry to a small portion of the District.

Moreover, there are already conflicts between the interests of current landowners and the various plans. The City of Toronto's Official Plan, for example, has already caused disagreements between the City and some landowners, despite a number of site-specific exemptions in the implementing zoning by-laws. As a result, some landowners and other interested parties have already appealed approval of the City's plan to the Ontario Municipal Board.

Metro Toronto has objected to waterlot zoning, which restricts lakefill south of its Main Sewage Treatment Plant. The THC has raised similar objections to zoning that conflicts with their Outer Harbour Marina; private landowners, concerned at the way new policies will restrict their redevelopment plans, are also requesting referrals to the OMB. While discussions continue in the hope of settling at least some of these matters, others will clearly have to be ruled on by the Ontario Municipal Board.

It becomes clear in reading the various plans and reports that there is a widespread perception that a significant amount of land in the Port Industrial District is vacant or under-utilized. Members of the Work Group consider this view an oversimplification of the land development process. Activities in the District change within the context of Toronto's economy, politics, and society, and they respond to new technologies —



as they have since the early days of the City's existence. Changes in production processes, shipping technologies, and patterns of demand for certain commodities render traditional uses obsolete or reduce the need for waterfront locations. Similarly, a firm's rent or the value of its land may increase to the point where it can no longer justify a waterfront site.

Companies may be committed to an area because of long-term contractual obligations on which they made investment decisions, just as location decisions are made on the basis of future corporate need or business development strategies. To some degree, intensive use of lands south of the Ship Channel (Map 9) may be influenced by the presence of infrastructure, especially sanitary sewers and public transportation. Moreover, it may take some time for development to proceed and cooperation among all participants is needed.

The calls for residential development in the Port Industrial District were a major issue for the Work Group. Housing in the Port Industrial District is not a new idea: as far back as 1925 the City of Toronto suggested to the harbour commission that housing be developed on the then-newly created industrial lands. The THC had built these lands expressly for industry and, not surprisingly, did not view the suggestion favourably.

More recently, the area south of the Ship Channel has been suggested as a site for residential development: the Housing and Neighbourhoods Work Group Report to the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront recommended it. In 1988, prior to the adoption of the City's new Official Plan Amendment for the Central Waterfront, a report discussed the possibility. Six constraints were identified on assembling land for housing at this location:

- land availability: "there is no major portion of the area south of the Ship Channel available for housing at this time" [City of Toronto. Planning and Development Department, April 25 1988.];
- isolation: the presence of a minimum number of people is necessary for a normal range of community services to be established and these would have to be provided up-front at considerable expense;
- lack of servicing: new sanitary and storm sewers and a sewage pumping station, plus roadways and water lines, would be necessary regardless of the size of the community;



- environmental constraints: the quality of soil in the area may have been seriously affected by previous industrial processes or simply as a result of the lakefill material used to create the land; thorough studies are necessary to determine if the lands can be prepared to a state suitable for residential development; recent experience with the St. Lawrence Square housing project indicates that an environmental clean-up is expensive and time-consuming;
- impact on neighbouring industry: residential development will have a destabilizing influence on existing industry;
- impact on open space and parks: new residential development could reduce the type and extent of open space available along the north shore of the Outer Harbour; the proximity of a residential neighbourhood could cause the existing open space to be reduced and developed for local park needs. [City of Toronto. Planning and Development Department, April 25, 1988, pp. 15-19.]

The report concluded that housing on the south side of the Ship Channel is possible only if it is developed on a comprehensive basis, and there is little likelihood of that happening. The large landowners in the area (Ontario Hydro and the Toronto Harbour Commissioners) would have to support residential development before City planners would consider changing the Official Plan. Neither body currently supports residential development for this area.

In spite of the City staff's conclusion, a decision based more on political expediency than on sound planning principles could result in the introduction of housing into the Port Industrial District. The joint action of the Province of Ontario and the City of Toronto on the recently announced St. Lawrence Square Project is an indication of the political and financial support currently available for residential development. Furthermore, both *Bold Concept II* and the Toronto Ontario Olympic Council plans propose housing on substantial sites in the Port Industrial District.

The Work Group unanimously recommends that housing not be developed in the Port Industrial District. While the housing situation in the Toronto area is indeed grave, the current crisis should not override awareness of the long-term need for employment opportunities.

Even though the opportunity of having both housing and employment within reasonable proximity to each other is seen as a desirable distribution of land-use activities, not every area should have mixed uses. Housing on some specific sites, such as the Port Industrial District, may have serious repercussions for industry. As we have seen elsewhere along the waterfront, the introduction of housing into industrial areas unleashes a series of market-forces and environmental problems that eventually drive existing industry to relocate and thereby eliminate the potential for new investment in production processes.

The region's economy cannot afford the risk that any encroachment by housing will be viewed by industry as a signal of rapid industrial decline and a reason for closing down or relocating plants. The Port Industrial District has the largest and most significant lands for industrial job creation on the waterfront, and a number of opportunities for its creative revitalization are suggested in the next section.

Environmental problems — air and water pollution and soil contamination, as well as the general character and appearance of the area — are a major issue in the Port Industrial District. The fact that soil contamination has become a concern in nearby locations is obviously relevant in the District, which was created largely from material dredged from the lake bottom. Moreover, worry has been expressed about soil conditions resulting from previous actions of landowners and occupants: it is likely that, over the years, contaminants now understood to be hazardous were left behind after noxious industrial production processes were moved elsewhere.

The proposed mix of new industrial activities for the Port Industrial District suggests that the general appearance of the area will become increasingly important. Recent plans for industrial parks demonstrate a high level of concern for and interest in landscaping. In addition, the creation of public access to parks and open space means the area's general appearance will have to be improved.

Another major issue in the Port Industrial District is the future of the R.L. Hearn Electricity Generating Station, which occupies more than 20 hectares (50 acres) of land and is owned by Ontario Hydro. Because of the site's size and the buildings on it, development of this facility would probably have a dramatic impact on the Port Industrial District. Ontario Hydro considers the Hearn Generating Station an important



component in generating electricity for Toronto's downtown area and an essential source of back-up power. Furthermore, the complex has the potential for supplying heat in a district heating system (an arrangement in which one plant produces heat for several buildings in an area).

Ontario Hydro has requested heavy industrial zoning for the R.L. Hearn Generating Station site, which would permit the utility to store materials outdoors. While Hearn Station has been converted (at least in part) to natural gas, a continued interest in coal as a back-up fuel for electricity generation would appear to be partly responsible for the requested zoning change. Converting the plant to coal would present pollution problems.

Despite Ontario Hydro's strong commitment to the site, other agencies have proposed alternative uses in the event that the utility ceases to use all or part of the property. For example, a district heating project has been proposed for the site. But the submission to the Royal Commission from Ontario Hydro indicates that the generating station is not likely to be considered surplus in the near future. If a decision were made to eliminate coal as an emergency fuel supply, a portion of the site could be made available for reinvestment to more intensive second-generation industrial activity.

## Opportunities

The existence of the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront creates a new reality in the debate over what should happen to the waterfront. The largest single tract of land there is the Port Industrial District, with about 370 hectares, and opportunities for its redevelopment should be considered most carefully.

The Group supports the adoption of a 'No Sale' policy with respect to lands held by public agencies on the waterfront. The Toronto Harbour Commissioners have recently adopted such a policy, and we urge the Royal Commission to recommend that all other public agencies do likewise. Clearly, if waterfront lands had not been sold in earlier times, the current planning exercise would be considerably simplified.

Rights to occupy and conduct business on waterfront property should be negotiated as fixed-term land leases. This ensures that a company has a reasonable time in which to



amortize its investment and make a profit, while also ensuring that land will return to public control in the future. A fixed-term land lease gives a company or developer necessary security of tenure to undertake a development project but guarantees that the property can be recycled according to public priorities when a lease is terminated.

When leasing is the only option available, the private sector is assured that the 'rules of the road' prevail and that any individual firm's competitive position is not going to be jeopardized. If this practice is consistently applied, all parties should be able to negotiate terms for an agreement, which gives the private sector the opportunity to participate in and profit from waterfront development while maintaining the public interest. However, the public must also benefit from leasing arrangements, and long-term capital appreciation of waterfront lands is a profit that properly belongs to the public.

An opportunity for developing industrial or business parks exists in the Port Industrial District. New second-generation industry should be located in these parks, which would provide a substantial opportunity to strengthen and diversify the local economy. That, in turn, would help establish a working waterfront, offer the chance to replace employment already lost in other districts, and support provincial, Metro and City economic development objectives.

The teleport and Port Area Business Park proposed for Toronto Harbour Commissioners' land at the foot of Leslie Street is a worthwhile and immediate economic development opportunity. The THC has submitted a plan of subdivision for approval, and the City of Toronto's Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO) is assisting in attracting firms to the area and in obtaining planning approval.

Telesat is already established as a tenant and anchor for telecommunications business interests in the business park. The development of these previously vacant lands provides a new focal waterfront location, close to the central core, for second-generation industry and business services that are a central component of government economic development policies. A continued effort to utilize these lands in this manner offers a real opportunity to locate a growing business sector in Toronto.



The THC has also proposed a business park for Polson Quay, and has suggested that the west side of Cherry Street could be used as a site for research and development companies, as well as for business activities. THC policies of retaining and strengthening the existing Commissioners Street area reveals a concern for existing high-employment industries in the area.

The Work Group identified an opportunity to attract the film and film-related industry to Toronto's Port Industrial District; this is a rapidly growing industrial sector with a mixture of diverse job possibilities that could include, not just feature-film production, but also shorts and documentary films, music videos, advertising, and educational films.

Recent press articles and estimates prepared by the City of Toronto have outlined the tremendous economic spin-offs from the film industry. There is an exciting opportunity to create a comprehensively planned film centre with a school for theatre arts, film studios, technical support workshops and laboratories, and a theatre centre. The centre could provide space and support for the large number of independent and semi-independent businesses, technicians, and craftspeople associated with film and theatre arts.

The film centre could build on the success Toronto has already demonstrated in attracting film production, and on the small but important presence of film-related companies in the Port Industrial District. In 1986, the THC sold property on the south side of Lakeshore Boulevard East to Showline (1986) Inc. to build a film studio, which is currently under construction. A film centre could help create permanence for the industry and reduce its vulnerability to fluctuations in exchange rates and government investment regulations.

We urge that consideration be given to planning and developing an integrated film centre in the Port Industrial District.

Although we will comment specifically on the Port in Sub-section 9, the Work Group has identified an opportunity to attract water-dependent and water-related industry to the Port Industrial District. These industrial sites must be located adjacent to dockwalls to be able to take advantage of the port facilities. The amount of land to be allocated for such port-related industry is a contentious issue.



Recognizing the complex connections between the Port and surrounding industry, the Work Group recommends that sufficient land be allocated to those industries currently dependent on water-borne transportation and that a reasonable amount of space be provided for the needs of future dockwall users. This would include land for construction materials industries currently using truck transport to enter Toronto.

We see the need for systematic environmental planning in the Port Industrial District as an opportunity: with comprehensive planning, it would be possible to mitigate the environmental problems that have recently been identified. Redevelopment in the Industrial District should include cleaning up highly contaminated soils, reducing air pollution by industry, and eliminating disposal of toxic wastes. In some cases, dangerously contaminated lands or buildings will have to be decommissioned and brought up to acceptable environmental standards.

Furthermore, and in support of efforts to encourage reinvestment and growth of second-generation industry, we urge that programs be established, in cooperation with all owners and tenants, to improve the general appearance of the District. Previous suggestions have included implementing an "Industrial Business Improvement Area" plan, which would require co-operative action between government and the private sector.

Finally, we would like to reiterate our view that the Port Industrial District is a prime location at which to promote second-generation industrial employment and that proposals to develop housing in the area should be rejected.

## **9. Port of Toronto**

The Toronto Harbour was defined by statute in the *Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Act*, 1911 and in the 1963 *Ontario Harbours Agreement Act*, but the areas that actually function as a working port have changed over time. Earlier in this century, much of what are now the Central Bayfront and Harbourfront lands were part of the Port of Toronto. Currently, however, virtually all Port facilities are in the Port Industrial District or the East Bayfront. The area usually associated with port functions (Map 9) is under the jurisdiction of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, but there are also docks



operated by private corporations for their use. In order to understand the operations of the Port, it is necessary first to review the mandate of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners.

Toronto's Port and Harbour is administered by an organization unique in the system of Canadian ports and harbours: by an act of Parliament in 1911, the Government of Canada created a *corporation* called the Toronto Harbour Commissioners. The corporation was given jurisdiction over the Port and Harbour of Toronto and charged with the responsibility of developing, maintaining, and managing the Harbour and all property under its control. In operating the Port, it was empowered to pass by-laws controlling navigation, to construct and operate docks, channels, railways, warehouses, equipment, etc. Moreover, the *Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Act* specifically gave the corporation the power to acquire land, and expropriate property, and to hold, sell, lease, and dispose of property under its control and to reinvest the proceeds. Clearly, despite its name, the THC had much broader power than just managing the Port.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners is the only harbour commission in Canada in which the majority of its members are appointed by a municipal government, in this case the City of Toronto. Three commissioners are appointed by Toronto City Council and two by the Governor in Council, one of whom is nominated by the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Toronto.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners is not required to follow federal budgetary procedures under the *Financial Administration Act*. Rather, the corporation sets its own financial control systems, but its books "shall at all times be open for inspection by the Audit Department of the City of Toronto; and the Corporation shall report annually all its proceedings in connection therewith to the Council of the City". [*Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Act*, 19 May 1911, 1-2 George V, Chapt. 26, clause 18.] In addition the Corporation "shall account for all monies borrowed, received and expended by it...to the Governor in Council". [*ibid*, clause 31.]

The THC was given the power to fund capital projects and borrow directly from banks (subject to certain approvals). It derives revenues from harbour tolls, shipping fees, and the sale and lease of its lands. The THC's reliance on its Port-related revenues, land sales, and leases is important, not only for its operations, but also for the history of waterfront development.





*Port of Toronto, Terminal 51, May 1982.*

Photo courtesy of the Toronto Harbour Commission Archives, PC 18/2/1070.

The major and currently existing THC port facilities as well as those of individual companies are listed with a brief description of each.

### **1. Marine Terminals No. 28 and 29**

Built in the 1950s with the expectation of increased traffic with the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway, these two former marine terminals are utilized by transportation, warehousing and recreational sports companies. The dock area is used for port operations.

### **2. Marine Terminal No. 35**

Marine Terminal No. 35 is used for a variety of warehousing and storage operations. The Atlas heavy lift crane, located at the terminal, is an important part of the special project cargo activities. Also, a major intermodal container trans-shipment operation occupies a significant portion of the site.

### **3. Marine Terminal No. 51 and Container Distribution Centre Warehouse 52**

Marine Terminal No. 51 is the primary general cargo facility in the Port and is used as the main overseas and project handling area.

The Container Distribution Centre, CDC Warehouse 52, provides facilities for the packing of consolidated cargo and full container handling. Special refrigerated and storage facilities are located within the warehouse.

The roll-on-roll-off (ro-ro) facility is located within the terminal area, as are large outdoor cargo storage areas.

This is the proposed location for the Trans-Lake Ferry Terminal.

A new garage is being constructed in the area for port operations.

### **4. THC Marine Yard**

Located on the south side of the Keating Channel, the THC Marine Yard is the centre for maintenance, repair, and marine operations.

## **5. North Side of the Ship Channel**

The north side of the ship channel is used predominantly by firms which ship liquid bulk materials. The major firms utilizing the docks are: McAsphalt Industries Limited (liquid asphalt); Liquiterminals Ltd. (edible oils, etc.); and Darling and Company (liquid tallow).

Cliffside Pipelines owns property on the north side of the Ship Channel where it meets the Turning Basin, with access to work boats (e.g., tugs) and barges.

The Harbour Masters' Public Dock is located in the Turning Basin of the Ship Channel.

The THC's Pier 43 on the north side of the Turning Basin is expected to be the location of a new aggregate shipping operation, which is anticipated to grow significantly in the near future with Toronto's expanding construction activity.

## **6. South Side of the Ship Channel**

Road salt is the predominant cargo handled on the south side of the Ship Channel. Aggregate is handled at a private operation on the east end of Ontario Hydro's Hearn Generating Station.

## **7. Other Dock Users**

Redpath Sugars Limited uses the docks for importing raw sugar from many overseas countries. On an adjacent lot, Redpath stores raw sugar for use during the winter when the St. Lawrence Seaway is closed.

The Gooderham and Worts Ltd. dock in the Parliament Street slip is used to bring in molasses (to make rum) to its plant.

The Victory Soya Mills dock, located in the Parliament Street slip, is used for shipping soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean oil. About 30 per cent of the soybeans are shipped in by water to the firm's dock.

The Canada Malting Company Limited dock, west of the Parliament Street Slip, is used for shipping malt by rail, truck, and water-borne transport.



The Lake Ontario Cement dock is north of Marine Terminal No. 35 and is used to ship cement into Toronto for distribution to the company's customers and ready-mix operations. Significant increase in demand is expected in conjunction with Toronto's construction industry.

The Canada Cement LaFarge dock is south of Marine Terminal No. 35 and is used to ship cement into Toronto for the construction industry. Demand is expected to continue and increase with the rate of construction in Toronto.

It is difficult to obtain actual estimates of the number of employees whose jobs are directly associated with Port facilities. The number of stevedores or longshoremen does not constitute a complete representation. While they are an important part of the Port employment base, jobs related to Port activity also include: those in industries located in the immediate Port and making direct use of Port facilities; employment outside the Port area in companies that rely on Port facilities to obtain raw materials and/or move products to market; and the many transportation companies that have access to the facilities.

Systematic time-series data on commodities through the Port have been difficult to obtain. However, total traffic in the Port has gone from about 5.6 million tonnes in 1970 to 2.1 million in 1988. A substantial portion of the decrease can be attributed to the virtual elimination of coal shipments when the R.L. Hearn Generating Station switched to natural gas. However, the 1988 figure is still less than that of 1975, when very little coal was being shipped, and total traffic was about 3.0 million tonnes.

During the last two years, the amount of cement shipped into the Port has increased considerably, as the result of Toronto's construction boom. Construction materials such as cement or aggregate are bulky and heavy, and a modal choice decision is sensitive to relative transportation rates. Because water transportation is cheaper than rail or truck, and because the Toronto area is expected to continue to have a healthy construction sector, shipments of these commodities through the Port are expected to increase.

A number of plans have been formulated that have direct implications for the Port of Toronto. The first is the City of Toronto's recently approved Official Plan Amendment for the Central Waterfront. Policies in the plan recognize City

Council's intention of strengthening the Port Industrial District as an important industrial location that contains Toronto's major Port facilities and dockwall sites. Further, Council seeks the Toronto Harbour Commissioners' cooperation to ensure that uses requiring direct access to shipping facilities are compatible with the plan, and particularly encourages the THC to locate firms requiring direct access to shipping facilities in the Inner Harbour.

The plan encourages new Port-using industries that will adhere to high environmental protection standards, and proposes to reduce the area designated for heavy industries. That reduction is important because many heavy-industry firms are Port-related and typically require open storage. The plan speaks of a need to provide defined areas for industries that require open storage of raw materials, and specifically includes policies to limit dust-generating uses, including those involving outdoor coal storage. [*City of Toronto Official Plan Amendment for the Central Waterfront*, sections 5A.32, 5A.15, 5A.16.]

The plan also includes policies directed at enhancing the area's image and attractiveness to the public. It indicates that land from a line approximately 92 metres (300 feet) south of Unwin Avenue and continuing to the water's edge should be used for water-related recreational purposes. However, if necessary, the THC could use these lands for Port purposes.

The idea of establishing a water's edge promenade along the North Shore of the Outer Harbour is encouraged in the plan, except where shipping makes that impossible. The sale or lease of lands is not permitted within seven metres (23 feet) of the shoreline of Lake Ontario.

Metropolitan Toronto's plans are also relevant to the Port. As discussed earlier, Metro's Official Plan is currently under review and a background document [Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. *Industrial Areas*, 1988.] for that review suggests that Metro has an interest in the Port and the surrounding industrial district. Its interest is directly related to Metro's concern about the region's shipping needs, about the potential for generating employment in the area, and about the consequences of Port operations on regional infrastructure and water-related activities. The background report recognizes that the Port is changing and discusses what that means in reaching objectives for Metropolitan Toronto's transportation, industry, and tourism.



The report comes to the conclusion that industrial land should be maintained to meet the needs of current and future Port users.

The Province of Ontario has an interest in Great Lakes shipping and its impact on the provincial economy. In 1980, the provincial Ministry of Transportation and Communications convened the Great Lakes/Seaway Task Force, which was to conduct investigations and make policy recommendations related to the seaway system. The Provincial Marine Office, which works to improve the use of all Ontario ports and is active in efforts to develop specific ports, recognizes the continuing importance of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Great Lakes to Ontario business, and suggests that, as part of this overall strategy, facilities in the Port of Toronto be maintained.

The federal government's jurisdictional responsibilities for shipping in navigable waters is well established, and the Port of Toronto is part of the system of Canadian ports. In 1983, the *Canada Ports Corporation Act* was proclaimed, aimed at creating an efficient port network coordinated with other transportation systems. Canadian ports are to serve the country's international trade and national, regional, and local economic and social objectives.

According to the Act, three types of port administration are recognized: Crown corporations, harbour commissions, and public harbours. Fifteen Canadian ports are operated by Crown corporations, and there are nine harbour commissions. The many public harbours are administered directly by the federal Department of Transportation. Each harbour commission has a high degree of local autonomy to operate its port in a manner consistent with the Department of Transport's policies.

The *Canada Ports Corporation Act* had been in the making for more than 10 years before it was adopted, and it has profoundly changed some port operations. However, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners has remained essentially an autonomous local port corporation with objectives consistent with the new legislation.

Other federal policies also affect the operations of Great Lakes ports: setting rates for use of the St. Lawrence Seaway system; providing subsidies for competing transportation modes; and ensuring that the use of ports supports federal

government programs. It has been suggested that the decline in shipping in the Port of Toronto may have been caused by some of these policies.

The plans of the Toronto Ontario Olympic Council and the *Bold Concept II* scheme both have direct implications for the Port. While it is not necessary to repeat the descriptions of these once more, it should be noted that *Bold Concept II* would restrict the Port to an area on the southwest corner of the Port Industrial District, and the Olympic plan, though less specific, would appear to virtually eliminate Port facilities.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners' *Port Industrial Area Concept Plan* (Map 10), released in 1988, is the most recent indication that it intends to maintain the Port by supporting redevelopment of the Port Industrial District and consolidation of the Port. One of the primary goals of the Plan is to provide for the current and future needs of Port users. The Plan's 20-year phased program acknowledges the need to deal with existing lease agreements and private-sector investment decisions; it tends to maximize use of the THC's dockwalls, ship channel, and railway investments. It identifies the phased development of a redefined and consolidated Port on both sides of the Ship Channel which, the THC contends, offers the most efficient operations base.

A portion of the south side of Unwin Avenue is designated as the most desirable location for a future trans-lake ferry and related support and service areas. Port-related activities are to continue to be located close to the dockwalls in the Ship Channel, but existing open storage on the south side of the Ship Channel is to be relocated to the north side.

Recently, the THC announced that it was embarking on a \$5-million long-range program to upgrade Port facilities.

After reviewing the various plans for the Port, the Work Group decided that the primary issue is the extent to which, if at all, Toronto should support Port facilities and Port-related industries.

We found that both defenders and critics of the Port have strongly held opinions and it is unlikely that a plan for the future of the Port could be devised that would satisfy both groups. Those who believe that Toronto does not need a Port draw attention to declining tonnages. The decrease in shipments, they argue, indicates that the Port is no longer a useful

facility and that other facilities on Lake Ontario can accommodate Toronto's needs, so that existing Port real estate can be put to better use.

Supporters of the Port argue that a variety of alternate transportation modes are necessary for a healthy economy. Competition among different types of transportation is important to keep operators from imposing unwarranted price increases. Moreover, without the Port, a variety of industry that is related to or dependent on the Port could not exist on the waterfront. Even though tonnage through the Port has declined, there are shipments of a number of commodities that have remained stable over the years, and some have even increased. These commodities are necessary to provide raw materials for basic industries (such as food production and construction) in the City.

The members of the Work Group unanimously agreed that Toronto's Port is vital, and policies to enhance its presence should be adopted. We noted the importance of the Port to a working waterfront. We believe that a functioning Port contributes to the mix, scale, and spirit of activity that, in our opinion, is necessary for Toronto's waterfront. We are reminded of E.L. Cousins' statement in 1925 that the benefits from Port improvements were intended to result not so much from "harbour dues or revenue from Great Lakes tonnage as from the general benefit that would accrue to the City". [quoted from Merrens, 1988, p. 96.]

Assuming that Toronto should have a port, how much land is required for port facilities and port-related industry? Obviously, there is a wide variety of opinion on the amount of land that should be dedicated to the Port and its related uses. The THC, through its Concept Plan, has identified the facilities it considers necessary to meet present and future shipping and transportation needs. The City of Toronto, through its Central Waterfront Official Plan Amendment, has also approved policies based on its understanding of Port needs. Unfortunately, there is a conflict between the two plans on what constitutes the needs of present and future shipping and related industry.

The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto indicated a concern for changes in the Port and its facilities and recommended additional study to determine the extent of its interest. The Toronto Ontario Olympic Council's preliminary plans for

a waterfront-centred Olympics, and the wide-ranging concepts contained in *Bold Concept II*, relegate the Port to a substantially reduced or non-existent role.

The Work Group identified a number of opportunities that support our position on the amount of land that should be maintained for port facilities and port-related industries.

## Opportunities

The Work Group concluded that the Port of Toronto is in itself an opportunity. An active port is part of Toronto's waterfront heritage, and is fundamental to our concept of a working waterfront. A port supports, directly and indirectly, a substantial number of job opportunities and promotes current and future economic growth.

The Port should not be eliminated or relocated outside Toronto. Suggestions have been made that Port lands could earn a higher return if they were used for other purposes. However, estimating the costs and benefits of any particular land use is fraught with uncertainties and complexities, but undertaking an analysis of the Port would be particularly difficult because it is the centre of a web of economic linkages. For example, the costs of trucking cement, aggregate, and other construction materials used for core-area development into Toronto, would have to include increasing traffic on an already congested highway system, and the possible need to replicate existing infrastructure and service facilities.

Of greater concern is the incalculable cost of a lost future opportunity. If the Port were eliminated, the possibility of meeting a demand for any water-transportation facility would be virtually lost. As with the loss of industrial land, if the Port facilities were closed it is highly unlikely new ones would be created in the future.

The Work Group has three specific recommendations for Toronto's Port facilities. First, efforts should be made to increase their use in bringing in materials used in the construction industry. As noted, cement and aggregate used in construction are already supplied through the Port; using it for precast and other bulk items should be encouraged. One of the benefits of increasing water-borne shipments would be to ease pressure on a road system that is already near capacity. One component of truck traffic, the movement of construction materials, could



*Ship maintenance and repair — a traditional waterfront industry.*

Photo courtesy of City of Toronto Archives, G & M 80199.

be reduced with little increase in public expenditure. Similarly, the continued movement of road salt through the Port offers significant advantages and should be encouraged.

Second, at least four levels of government — the City of Toronto, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, the Province of Ontario, and the Government of Canada — need marine maintenance and repair services to support their waterfront activities. There is no co-ordinated facility to accommodate these needs. The THC has suggested one, in conjunction with its works yard, on the south side of the Keating Channel.

We recommend that the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, as owners of these lands, initiate discussions with all interested government agencies to develop a full-service marine centre. It could include docking, service, and repair facilities for government boats, and is an opportunity for cooperation among the four levels of government.

Finally, we see the need for marine maintenance and repair facilities for recreational boats. Such waterside repair facilities are not generally available in the Toronto area. The popularity of sail and power boats has increased dramatically over the years: since the early 1970s, the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority has completed three (and is working on the fourth) marina-centred leisure parks on the Metro waterfront. With the increase in recreational boating, an integrated maintenance and repair facility is needed. A number of possible locations have been suggested for this facility, most prominently at the THC's Outer Harbour Marina. This type of facility would generate a number of jobs for a variety of skilled workers.

## **10. Leslie Street Spit<sup>5</sup>**

The Leslie Street Spit (also known as Tommy Thompson Park) is a human-made peninsula extending south and west five kilometres (3.11 miles) into Lake Ontario from the foot of Leslie Street on the eastern flank of Toronto's waterfront. Begun in the mid-1950s, it now comprises about 121 hectares (300 acres) of land and 101 hectares (250 acres) of embayments and lagoons.

---

5. This section relies heavily on Gene Desfor and Roy Merrens, "Toronto May Lose Urban Wilderness", *Alternatives*, Vol. 13, December 1985, pp. 26-29.

In the mid-1950s, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners saw the need to expand Toronto's Port by creating additional facilities in an outer harbour, in order to accommodate shipping expected as a result of the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The THC initially intended the Spit as a breakwater that would protect the outer harbour; but when shipping declined dramatically in the early 1970s and investment in a new outer harbour could not be justified, the THC announced in 1972 that an Aquatic Park would be created on the Spit that, "can be implemented no matter which direction port expansion takes." [Gemmil, 1978, p. 11.] Issues of ownership and jurisdiction, however, complicated these plans.

The issues were eventually resolved when the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (MTRCA) was designated by the Province as the agency responsible for planning, interim management, and development of the Spit. The THC now leases part of the Spit from the provincial government for disposal of dredgeate, construction rubble, and excavation material. It also has jurisdiction over some water-lots on a strip of land near the base of the Spit and adjacent to its 1,200-slip marina. The City of Toronto had virtually no control over the development of the Spit. Control has been held mainly by the THC and the MTRCA.

In 1983, after years of inconclusive development initiatives, the MTRCA constituted an Aquatic Park Task Force to reinstate a planning process that would produce a new master plan for the Spit. The Task Force consisted of representatives from the THC, the City of Toronto, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, and the provincial government. The Task Force has gone through an elaborate planning process to produce the Tommy Thompson Park Master Plan. While it has been approved by the MTRCA, its final adoption depends on the provincial environmental assessment process. Currently, the MTRCA is preparing an environmental impact statement that will be submitted to the provincial Ministry of Environment.

During the course of the public debate over the fate of the Spit, conducted spasmodically for almost 15 years, two polarities have emerged: on the one hand, there is an enthusiastic preference for the Spit as a raw urban wilderness, spontaneously developing into a diverse assemblage of geomorphic, faunal, and floral environments. "Let it be!" best encapsulates that view: advocates want the place left ungroomed, undeveloped, and not accessible to private vehicles.

On the other hand, those who wanted the Spit managed and transformed for recreational developments think the Spit "as it stands today exists as a foul-smelling, unsightly vacant lot, overrun with weeds, tangled brush and debris" [Commodore John Beasley of a sailing club in a letter to the City Planning Board]. Such advocates of capital-intensive development believe the Spit offers unique opportunities for amenities such as parks and recreation activities, yacht, community sailing and sailboarding clubs, and restaurants, all accessible by automobile and public transit.

In the battle over the fate of the Spit, urban wilderness proponents appear to have lost, and the option of allocating a substantial chunk of urban land to a new kind of park is on the way to being rejected. The MTRCA's Master Plan envisions two zones on the Spit: a so-called 'natural area' and a general recreational district. The 'natural area' is to be *managed* to provide a range of habitats including marsh lands, dry and wet meadows, shoreline ponds, beaches and dunes, and shingle beaches. The general recreation area would provide space for an interpretative centre and a variety of sailing clubs, all of which would have access to the area by automobile and public transit, with car parking areas provided.

Final attempts to strike a balance between the competing philosophies for development of the Leslie Street Spit seem to have failed.

A majority of Work Group members feel that the uses planned by the MTRCA are unlikely to have a measurable impact on the jobs, opportunities, or economic growth of the waterfront. Given the known bent of the MTRCA for recreational and open space, it is possible that the Province supported those uses when it turned over control of the Spit to that body. The majority is therefore disinclined to suggest options for use of the Spit within the context of our mandate, although opportunities for jobs and economic growth clearly exist.

A minority of the Work Group's members agree with their colleagues in the Environment and Health Work Group that diverse land uses are necessary for a balanced and healthy waterfront, and that the Leslie Street Spit should remain an urban wilderness area. Leaving urban open space to evolve naturally is increasingly recognized and accepted as a legitimate process for creating a special type of park. Other kinds of

open spaces are available on the waterfront, but the Spit, as it has developed over the last two decades or so, is unique, not only to Toronto, but also to Canadian cities in general.

Intentionally altering the Spit would mean permanently losing an invaluable part of Toronto's waterfront. The Spit is the only place in the metropolis where people can experience out-of-town quiet only moments from the city centre. Among the active recreation uses it accommodates are bicycling, jogging, hiking, bird-watching, and roller skating. There are even a few sailing clubs. The Spit includes designated Environmentally Significant Areas and has become a natural laboratory for those wishing to understand and observe processes of ecological succession.

Two specific environmental problems arise from the MTRCA's plans for the Spit. First, they require lakefilling of Environmentally Significant Areas in order to relocate sailing clubs and to build parking lots. Lakefilling on the Spit has already involved seriously contaminated soil. Second, car access would be made possible on a regular basis on the neck of the Spit, an area that currently functions as a transition zone from the industrial activity to the north.


## **11. Greenwood Racetrack Area**

The site of the Greenwood Racetrack is about 32.5 hectares (80 acres), divided between the 26.3 hectares (65 acres) of track owned by the Ontario Jockey Club, and parking facilities of 6 hectares (15 acres), owned in part by the City of Toronto and in part by Metropolitan Toronto.

While no plans for relocating the race track have been announced by the Jockey Club, suggestions have been made that it might move. Residents in the adjoining neighbourhood have long suffered from the traffic and noise problems associated with the track, but it has been in its current location since before the turn of the century.

If the racetrack were to move, a substantial parcel of land could be used for a mix of second-generation industrial activity and housing. The parcel is large enough to support a mixed-use concept, and the servicing infrastructure is apparently largely in place. The site provides possibilities for a waterfront community that would include water-related industry and housing that could develop links to the shore.

## **12. The Scarborough Waterfront (Map 11)**



*Map 11. The Scarborough Waterfront*

The Centennial Industrial District and the Coronation Industrial District are the major waterfront industrial areas in Scarborough.

The Centennial District is about 74 hectares (183 acres), where the Johns Manville site represents 70 per cent. In 1986, Johns Manville employed 111 people, a significant drop from its peak of 750 employees in 1979. Another firm on the site, General Electric, employed 24 people on its 8.4 hectares (21 acres). Another six or seven small firms are located in the district. [Scarborough, City of. 1986, p. 228.]

Johns Manville, clearly the most prominent firm associated with this industrial district, was established in 1946 to manufacture asbestos pipe. In 1983, the two most westerly buildings on the site were demolished leaving one building. Manville has attempted to clean up and rehabilitate about 16 hectares (40 acres) that have been contaminated with asbestos. The clean-up involves removing subsurface asbestos material and then concentrating it in the lagoon area. The lagoons will be capped and closed-off never to be developed.

The City of Scarborough is considering commercial, residential and industrial projects for the redevelopment of

the Centennial Industrial District once the environmental problems have been resolved.

Coronation Industrial District, immediately to the west of Centennial District, is about 80 hectares (198 acres) of which about 54 hectares (133 acres) are available for redevelopment. While the CN railway runs through the site, it suffers from a lack of road accessibility. Thirty-six of the thirty-eight sites are located on minor collector or local class roads. Employment here was estimated to be 1128 in 1986, the major firm in the district being Scarboro Movers with 384 employees. [Scarborough, City of. 1986, p. 151.]

With the exception of two modest-sized industrial zones, and some commercial and two important institutional uses, including a major Metro sewage treatment facility, much of the remainder of the Scarborough waterfront is unacceptable for water-related industrial purposes. Topography and the nature of the adjacent parkland and the presence of housing generally precludes notable new industrial development. The two industrial zones will likely face the same disinvestment pressures as those that have occurred in Etobicoke and are occurring in Toronto.

With the exception of Bluffer's Park, much of Scarborough's waterfront parkland serves local neighbourhoods, primarily because of limited access to them. Clearly, Bluffer's Park is a regional park, but it, too, has access and parking limitations at peak periods. Parking facilities are inadequate to meet current peak demand and overflow traffic adversely affects adjacent neighbourhoods.

The Guild Inn, operated by Metropolitan Toronto, is potentially an economic resource, but it is currently under-utilized. Consideration should be given to changes, in conjunction with the private sector, to enhance the facility as a recreation or conference centre.

## **13. Other Initiatives**

### **13.1 Olympic Games**

The Toronto Ontario Olympic Council has prepared a bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics and its preliminary plan posits extensive use of waterfront lands. The bid is supported by

the federal and provincial governments, as well as public individuals and prominent business people. Notable features of the plan include: an 80,000-seat Olympic Stadium at Exhibition Place, a rowing course in Humber Bay, an Olympic Village, and a building for swimming events in the Port Industrial District, as well as facilities for basketball, boxing, volleyball, and gymnastics in the Harbourfront area.

Unfortunately, the Work Group's efforts to meet with TOOC staff were unsuccessful and we therefore have no knowledge or insights concerning the details of the submission, construction costs or economic benefits to the Toronto area not available to the general public at the time this Report was prepared. However, it is clear from published plans that, if Toronto's bid is successful, the Games will have far reaching land-use and economic consequences for the waterfront, as well as for the greater Toronto urban economy.

According to an optimistic estimate, the Games' expected revenue would offset the capital and operating costs, or perhaps might earn a modest profit. This is based on the Calgary Winter Games model and the Los Angeles Summer Games of 1984. While financial plans for construction of the facilities and the methods for cost recovery are unknown at this time, they will probably entail a combination of local, provincial, and federal resources, with a variety of private-sector sponsors. It must be emphasized that the Los Angeles Games were profitable because organizers were able to use more than 10,000 volunteers.

TOOC and other proponents of the Olympic Games suggest many advantages that Toronto has over competing cities: it is adjacent to a large and affluent population base, and is able to take advantage of air transportation links to more distant population centres with relative ease. It has a strong hotel, restaurant, shopping, and general recreation framework to support the anticipated influx of tourists. Toronto has one of the finest mass transit systems in the world, which would be used to move visitors to and from the proposed sites of the Games. Toronto's reputation as a safe city is valuable and should not be overlooked.

TOOC's proposed facilities at their announced locations raise the following issues:

- displacement of industrial activity in the Port Industrial District;
- the question of future use of an 80,000-seat sports stadium adjacent to the SkyDome;
- the difficulty of employing people in service-sector jobs and making housing available to them;
- the possibility of over-extending Toronto's economy which is currently in the midst of exceptional economic growth and, in the construction industry, unprecedented expansion. However, in order to meet schedules, plans for design, planning, and approval of the Games' facilities would have to be implemented on a 'fast track' basis. The magnitude and speed of such a building program could increase pressure on the construction sector and result in shortages of labour and materials; there might be substantial inflation in a sector already characterized by rapidly escalating costs.

We explored the implications of the Games, and concluded that short-term advantages to Toronto's economy may be outweighed by longer-term disadvantages. Because Toronto's economy is currently operating at or close to capacity, Olympic facilities would have to displace other proposed land-use activities, some of which we have identified as essential to the continued existence and functioning of a working waterfront.

The Olympic Games proposal implies a process of waterfront change that is contrary to the strategy the Work Group believes is essential to the jobs, opportunities, and economic growth of the Toronto waterfront and of Metropolitan Toronto generally. We are recommending incremental growth that develops from an appreciation of the past and is built on a gradual transition from existing activities to future uses. Changes should reflect historical waterfront strengths and support healthy future trends. We see a growth pattern that is best characterized by the term evolutionary — in that it represents studied progress toward change.

Acceptance of the proposal for Olympic Games, sited predominantly on the waterfront, rejects that approach in favour of a sudden departure from previous experience.

The TOOC proposal requires large areas of lakefilling which raises serious environmental issues. For example, a rowing course in Humber Bay has been proposed that would need enormous amounts of fill but the amount of lakefill needed, material that would meet MTRCA's open-water dumping standards, may not be available from construction or other projects in the Toronto area. In addition, the rowing course would create embayments where serious sediment contamination and water quality problems could arise. Finally, the project would probably have to be exempted from a full environmental assessment, because such a review process would be lengthy and leave insufficient time for construction.

### **13.2 World's Fair 2000**

Recently, the Metro Toronto World's Fair Consortium announced plans for the World's Fair in the year 2000 to be hosted by Toronto. The Fair would be based at Exhibition Place and Ontario Place, on 182 hectares (450 acres) of land, and in the waters immediately to the south. The Fair's theme, a celebration of cities, would focus on the challenges and achievements of urban living and Toronto would certainly be an appropriate host for such an exhibit. However, there is still serious competition from the two remaining cities under consideration, Venice and Hanover, West Germany.

Support for the World's Fair bid has come from private-sector organizations, some of which have been working on the bid since 1985, and from the federal and provincial governments. Metro Toronto Council has approved the recently announced plans.

While the Consortium's announced plans are tentative and could very well change, they currently include:

- a new Trade Exhibition Centre, called Crystal Palace, which would be incorporated into the CNE's Automotive and Industry buildings, and a 500-room hotel adjacent to the Centre;
- a revamped Exhibition Stadium, final details of which must await the decision on Toronto's Olympic bid;
- 18 temporary pavilions located on the current site of the Food and Better Living buildings, which would be razed;



- a waterfront theatre, sports complex, and relocated CNE midway on 8.1 hectares (20 acres) of lakefill;
- a floating hotel and marina;
- a 2,000-unit housing development on six strips of land created by lakefilling; promoters of the project boast that it would have "clean beaches", all of them artificially heated.

In 1987, a report prepared by a group of consultants led by Price Waterhouse and funded in part by Ontario's Ministry of Tourism and Recreation concluded that Exhibition Place could comfortably accommodate a World's Fair. *Executive Task Force Report: Future Uses of Exhibition Place* suggested that a goal of 55 million visits was achievable and that a six-month fair would generate \$1.4 billion in operating revenues. The report said that revenues, including a lottery projected to generate \$250 million, would offset expected capital costs of \$891 million and \$792 million in anticipated operating costs; it also indicated that about 206,000 person-years of employment could be generated by such a fair.

More recently, in February 1989, proponents of the bid claimed that Toronto could break even or make money on World's Fair 2000. This claim is based on an average daily attendance of 425,000 people, or more than 63 million during the six-month Fair, which the proponents suggest would generate sufficient revenue to meet capital and operating costs.

The Fair's organizers claim that \$700 million in taxes would accrue to the provincial and federal government, and there would be a \$7-billion increase in Canada's gross domestic product.

Le Bureau International des Expositions has stated that, between December 1989 and May 1990, it would announce its decision on the Fair's location. The timing presents a problem, because it is prior to the International Olympic Committee's date for naming the host city for the 1996 Olympic Games. Could Toronto host both the Olympics and World's Fair? If not, which celebration would be preferable?

Critics of the Fair suggest that Toronto should carefully review its investment priorities before embarking on such an ambitious adventure. One City Councillor said, "When we no longer have food banks or hostels, then we can talk about a world's fair". [Jack Layton, *Saturday Magazine, The Toronto Star*, April 22, 1989, p.28.]

The extent of lakefilling and the heated, but clean, beaches raise serious environmental issues. As in the case of the Olympic Games plan, obtaining sufficient fill that meets MTRCA's open water dumping guidelines is unlikely. Moreover, serious and more general environmental problems associated with lakefilling are being identified and the entire practice is being questioned. If proposals were subject to a full provincial environmental assessment, there probably would not be time to complete construction.

Another unresolved issue is the perception that access and parking is inadequate for the scale of activities contemplated by the Fair.

The Work Group notes that two recent world's fairs (Nashville and New Orleans) failed to meet economic and financial forecasts, despite strong and sustained economic growth at the times they were in progress. We cannot project economic conditions far enough into the future to predict an outcome with certainty, but all aspects of the proposal should be monitored intensively to ensure that the event, if it occurred, would be a financial success.

A majority of members of the Work Group support the World's Fair concept and its objectives. On balance, they feel that the scale, timing, and anticipated benefits that would arise from it fit into the fabric of Toronto's waterfront.

# *5. Revitalizing the Waterfront Economy*

The Work Group has four general recommendations to make in order to bring about a revitalized waterfront economy; because they relate to the overall waterfront, they are discussed in this concluding section rather than in previous parts of the Report concerned with specific geographical areas.

First, the waterfront should be understood as an element of the Toronto region's economic, political, and ecological systems. Recent world-wide restructuring of production has been occurring and, in Toronto, the result is the economic prevalence of business, financial, personal, and information-based services. Although more people are employed in these services than in any other sector, industry is necessary for a healthy economy. Industry contributes to the wealth-producing capacity of the region, and many services exist to maintain or enhance industrial productivity.

From a political perspective, the waterfront serves a host of constituencies. Responsibility to these constituencies rests with local, municipal, provincial, and federal governments, and international agencies. The multiplicity of legislative jurisdictions, which are sometimes overlapping and sometimes ill-defined, is mentioned as a deterrent to reasoned waterfront planning.

The ecological system on Toronto's waterfront has just begun to receive concerted attention, but an ecological approach is essential if the problems of water and air quality, soil contamination, sewage treatment and disposal, and the preservation and enhancement of wildlife habitats are to be solved.

In sum, development and redevelopment on Toronto's waterfront is influenced by a wide range of factors, all of which are interwoven and regional by nature.

Second, waterfront planning and control should not be fragmented among autonomous, semi-autonomous, and special-purpose agencies — each operating with a distinct vision for the waterfront. This fragmentation of agencies and organizations precludes thoughtful and responsive waterfront management. There are precedents for a more comprehensive and integrated planning approach. For example, in 1972, the United States government passed legislation establishing a broad framework for coastal zone management to allocate waterfront land among competing industrial, commercial,

residential, natural habitat, and public recreational uses. According to the legislation, agencies with waterfront jurisdictions are jointly responsible for planning the use of land in short supply.

Third, individual and social costs associated with a rapidly changing economy should be identified clearly and programs to deal with problems arising from these costs should be established. The heavy social costs arising from the shift in the economy away from industry is not widely appreciated: among them are the loss of industrial jobs by workers who are unable to obtain new employment of a similar quality. Programs to allow these people to become productive and to share in the advantages of the new economy are inadequate: retraining programs are frequently inadequate, and financial assistance for relocating is meagre, at best.

Unfortunately, data on social costs of economic change are generally buried in aggregate economic statistics. Standard financial analyses usually relate to the economics of the firms involved and fail to measure a wide range of public costs. For example, when firms close down or relocate, workers may have to travel considerably longer distances to new jobs. The costs associated with new travel patterns — added transportation, new road or transit capacity — are not measured as part of the social costs of plant closings. The failure to include and consider such costs gives rise to the observation that many plant closings result from the inevitable consequence of free-market economics; however, that is clearly not the case.

Fourth, budgeting, accounting, financial, and analytical tools that identify and measure social change should be improved. The public's very limited knowledge of the costs associated with plant closings may result from governments' failure to measure social dislocation in a local or regional context, because governments tend to measure economic growth in terms of their own revenue requirements.

Budgetary and accounting protocols fail to reflect an appropriate concern by public authorities with the value of capital assets and can lead to an understatement of their value; that, in turn, increases the likelihood that they will be sold to the private sector. The public is unlikely to recover them at a reasonable cost.

The Work Group also identified a number of policy initiatives that could be used to encourage industries to remain or to relocate on the waterfront. These include:

- legislation that offers property-tax relief;
- legislation to establish tax relief zones;
- zoning by-laws that permit a greater mix of activities, including industrial, commercial, and residential uses and thereby reduce the tendency to eliminate old industrial zones;
- greater use of 'cross-subsidization' to support the retention of existing industry; this policy would work in much the same way luxury condominiums or office space support land costs of affordable housing. Local governments could support the land costs of existing industry by allocating money they earn from other, higher-profit activities on the site.

A major waterfront development issue is the extent of deferred capital investment in public facilities in the Toronto area. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities has estimated the extent of these investments at approximately \$15 billion. The Canadian Tax Foundation has tracked data on capital investments by local governments within each province since 1975. Their data give evidence of decreased capital assets (adjusted for inflation) and capital investment (including transportation and education) as a percentage of total expenditures. For local government units in Ontario the figure currently hovers below two per cent of total expenditures. Private-sector firms commonly spend between three and four per cent of their total expenditures on capital investment.

Moreover, the decline in public-sector investment has also occurred over a lengthy period, which means that only limited public infrastructure investments in water supply, sewage and storm water treatment, arterial transportation, and public transit have been initiated in the past decade.

One unanticipated consequence of the failure of Metro, the City and its other municipalities to undertake significant new infrastructure initiatives has been that large investments are now required to meet an accretion of infrastructure needs and permit the necessary catch-up to take place. No estimates have been made of the amount needed for investment in

infrastructure to accommodate increasing density and population growth — even the specifics of what is needed now have not been identified.

Obviously, careful consideration would have to be given to a method for financing such projects. There have been indications, for example, that the federal government will not pay for water-related infrastructure programs: in 1987, the then-Minister of the Environment reminded the Federation of Canadian Municipalities that municipalities are a provincial responsibility; moreover, he said, Ottawa saw no reason to help pay for water-related infrastructure projects when many Canadian municipalities were still using flat-rate water-metering systems, in effect selling water services for less than they cost.

New and innovative financing techniques may have to be found if Toronto is to avoid the very high debt service costs that marked Metro's early years. An examination of Metro's budgets in the 1960s shows that, at its highest point, the ratio of debt (including self-liquidating debt from activities funded by non-tax user fees) to total budget was more than 30 per cent. This compares to the current standards established by the Province, and generally agreed upon by municipal analysts, which suggest that the debt service ought not exceed 20 per cent of gross budget.

Metro and Ontario's system of regional governments were designed in large measure to meet and rationalize the expanded infrastructure needs caused by rapid urban growth; the wisdom of establishing regional levels of government can be measured by the generally excellent financial ratings — some of them are among the highest in North America — given to certain of the regional municipalities.

For the past decade or so, it has been almost a cliché to call Toronto 'a world-class city'. In days gone by, it had a less pretentious, more human-scale designation: "the city that works". We believe that Metropolitan Toronto and the municipalities that it encompasses are, indeed, a "city that works". It is our contention, however, that Torontonians and the governments that serve them must be aware that a city works — but only as long as people have real and sustainable opportunities to work within it.

# Bibliography

Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison. *Deindustrialization of America*. New York: Basic Books, 1982.

Breen, Ann and Dick Rigby. *Caution: Working Waterfront: the Impact of Change on Marine Enterprises*. Washington, D.C.: The Waterfront Press, 1985.

CN Real Estate. *City Place*. N.p.: CN Real Estate, 1988.

Cohen, Stephen and John Zysman. *Manufacturing Matters: the Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy*. New York: Basic Books, 1987.

Comay Planning Consultants, Sears and Russell Consultants, N. Barry Lyon Consultants and David Jackson Planning Consultants. *Metro Toronto Property Review: Report One: Proposed Development Program*. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Government Services, September 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Metro Toronto Property Review: Report Two*. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Government Services, September 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Metro Toronto Property Review: Report Three: Toronto Properties*. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Government Services, September 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Metro Toronto Property Review: Report Four: East Bayfront Properties*. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Government Services, September 1987.

Cresap Management Consultants. *Becoming an International Competitor: Metro's New Economic Development Strategy*. Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, April 1988.

Desfor, Gene. "Planning Urban Waterfront Industrial Districts: Toronto's Ashbridge's Bay, 1889-1910." *Urban History Review* 17, 2 (October 1988): 77-91.

Desfor, Gene, Michael Goldrick and Roy Merrens. "A Political Economy of the Water-Frontier: Planning and Development in Toronto." *Geoforum* (forthcoming 1989).

\_\_\_\_\_. "Redevelopment on the North American Water-Frontier: the Case of Toronto." In *Revitalizing the Waterfront: International Dimensions of Dockland Development*, eds. B. S. Hoyle, D. A. Pinder and M. S. Husain. 92-113. London: Belhaven Press, 1988.

Desfor, Gene and Roy Merrens. "Toronto May Lose Wilderness." *Alternatives* 13 (December 1985): 26-29.

Gemmil, Arlene. Toronto's Outer Harbour Eastern Headland: the Changing Role of a Transportation Facility. University of Toronto/York University Joint Program in *Transportation Research Report*, 55. Toronto: University of Toronto/York University Joint Program in Transportation, December 1978.

GLC Economic Planning Group. *Popular Planning Unit. Jobs for a Change*. London: Greater London Council, 1983.

Government of Canada. *Ontario Harbour Agreement Act, 12 Elizabeth II, Assented to 21st December 1963*. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Act, 1911, 1-2 George V, Assented to 19th May 1911*. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1911.

Grayson, Paul. *Corporate Strategy and Plant Closures*. Toronto: Our Times, 1985.

Guskind, Robert and Neal R. Peirce. "Faltering Festivals." *National Journal*, 38 (17 September 1988): 2307-2311.

Hack, Gary and Carr Lynch Associates Inc. *Recharting a Course for Harbourfront: an Assessment of Harbourfront Planning and Design, Prepared for Public Works Canada*. Cambridge, Mass.: Carr Lynch Associates Inc., 22 July 1987.

Harbourfront Futures Committee. *Report of the Harbourfront Futures Committee as Endorsed by the Harbourfront Corporation Board of Directors*. Toronto: Harbourfront Futures Committee, 14 September 1987.



Harrison, Bennett. *Manufacturing Matters: Conference Proceedings and Research Papers, 28 September 1988*. Toronto: The Industrial Development Institute, 1988.

Harrison, Bennett and Barry Bluestone. *The Great U-Turn*. Toronto: Basic Books, 1988.

Hurst, Lynda. "The Big Bash To Kick Off A New Century." *The Toronto Star, Saturday Magazine* 22 April 1989: 14-15, 28.

The Industrial Development Institute. *Package of Material from Manufacturing Matters: a Conference to Examine the De-Industrialization of Metro Toronto*. Toronto: The Industrial Development Institute, 1988.

Jacobs, Jane. *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*. New York: Random House, 1970.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Random House, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Economy of Cities*. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.

Jones, Jack H. and Shoreline Engineering Limited. *Bold Concept II: a Conceptual Plan for the Development of the Central Toronto Waterfront*. Toronto: Ontario. Special Advisor to the Premier on Waterfront Development, 1988.

Krahn, Harvey and Graham Lowe. *Work, Industry and Canadian Society*. Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1988.

Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto. *A Time for Public Leadership: Industrial Strategies for Metropolitan Toronto*. Toronto: Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 1983.

Lampe, David, ed. *The Massachusetts Miracle*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.

Luria, Dan and Jack Russell. *Rational Reindustrialization*. Detroit: Widgetripper Press, 1981.

Merrens, Roy. "Port Authorities as Urban Land Developers: the Case of The Toronto Harbour Commissioners and their Outer Harbour Project, 1912-1968." *Urban History Review* 17, 2 (October 1988): 92-111.

Metro Toronto World's Fair Consortium. Media Kit. Toronto: Metro Toronto World's Fair Consortium, 1989.

Metropolitan Toronto and York Region Labour Market and Training Needs Assessment. *Fourth Annual Report*. Toronto: Metropolitan Toronto and York Region Labour Market and Training Needs Assessment, April 1988.

Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, The. *A Greenspace Plan for the Greater Toronto Region*. Toronto: The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, October 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Lake Ontario Waterfront Development Project, 1987-1991*. Toronto: The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, November 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Metropolitan Toronto Waterfront Boating Demand Study Update*. Toronto: The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, May 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Tommy Thompson Park: Master Plan*. Toronto: The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, December 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Watershed Plan of the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority*. Toronto: The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, 1986.

Metropolitan Toronto, Municipality of. *Official Plan for the Urban Structure*. Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, January 1980.

Metropolitan Toronto, Municipality of. Executive Task Force on Future Uses of Exhibition Place. *Future Uses of Exhibition Place*. Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Executive Task Force, March 1987.

Metropolitan Toronto, Municipality of. Planning Department.

*The Changing Metropolitan Economy. Metropolitan Plan*

*Review, No. 2.* Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan

Toronto, 1986.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Employment Projections.* Toronto: Municipality of  
Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, 1984.

Metropolitan Toronto, Municipality of. Policy Development  
Division. Industrial Areas: a Background Document in the  
Review of "The Official Plan for the Urban Structure:  
Metropolitan Toronto". *Metropolitan Plan Review, No. 5.*  
Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Planning  
Department. Policy Development Division, 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Parks and Open Space: a Background Document in the  
Review of "The Official Plan for Urban Structure: Metropolitan  
Toronto".* *Metropolitan Plan Review, No. 7.* Toronto: Muni-  
cipality of Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department.  
Policy Development Division, September 1988.

Metropolitan Toronto, Municipality of. Transportation  
Division. *Central Area Transportation Issues: a Summary.*  
*Metropolitan Plan Review, No. 6.* Toronto: Municipality of  
Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department. Transportation  
Division, August 1988.

Meurer, Susan and David Sobel. *Tackling Technology: A  
Worker's Guide to Tech Change.* Toronto: Labour Council  
of Metropolitan Toronto, n.d.

Meurer, Susan, David Sobel and David Wolfe. *Challenging  
Technology's Myths: A Report on the Impact of Technological  
Change in Secondary Manufacturing in Metropolitan Toronto.*  
Toronto: Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 1987.

Mishel, Lawrence. *Manufacturing Numbers: How Inaccurate  
Statistics Conceal U.S. Industrial Decline.* Washington, D.C.:  
Economic Policy Institute, 1988.

Muszynski, Leon et al. *The De-Industrialization of Metropolitan  
Toronto: Case Studies.* Toronto: Social Planning Council of  
Metropolitan Toronto, June 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The De-Industrialization of Metropolitan Toronto: A Study of Plant Closures, Layoffs and Unemployment*. Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, June 1985.

Ontario Hydro. *Submission To The Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront*. Toronto: Ontario Hydro, 23 May 1989.

Ontario. Ministry of Government Services and City of Toronto. *St. Lawrence Square*. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Government Services and City of Toronto, July 1988.

Ontario. Ministry of Skills Development. *Adjusting to Change: an Overview of Labour Market Issues*. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Skills Development, 1988.

Ontario Planners Conference. *Lakeshore Workshop*. Etobicoke: City of Etobicoke, October 1987.

Ontario. Premier's Council. *Competing in the New Global Economy*, Vol. 1. Toronto: Ontario Premier's Council, 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Competing in the New Global Economy*, Vol. 2: Research Studies. Toronto: Ontario Premier's Council, 1988.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. *New Roles for Cities and Towns*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1987.

Scarborough, City of. *Urban Design Guidelines*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough, 1987.

Scarborough, City of. Department of Planning, Department of Works and Department of Economic Development. *Network 2011: Scarborough's Response*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Department of Planning, Department of Works, and Department of Economic Development, February 1986.

Scarborough, City of. Economic Development Department. *Industrial, Commercial and Office Strategy*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Economic Development Department, March 1986.

Scarborough, City of. Planning Department. *Northeast Scarborough Land-Use Study: Background Report*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Planning Department, May 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Northeast Scarborough Land-Use Study: Concepts Report*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Planning Department, 5 May 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Northeast Scarborough Land-Use Study: Natural and Environmentally Sensitive Areas Report*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Planning Department, December 1984.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Northeast Scarborough Land-Use Study: Notification Report*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Planning Department, May 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Northeast Scarborough Land-Use Study: Proposals Report for the Upper Rouge Community Secondary Plan*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Planning Department, May 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Northeast Scarborough Land-Use Study: Revised Concepts Report*. Scarborough: City of Scarborough Planning Department, September 1987.

Strain, Jeanne. "The Newmarket Industrial District: An Innovative Approach to Bolstering Industrial Employment in Boston." Presented at *Manufacturing Matters: A Conference To Consider the De-Industrialization of Metro Toronto*, 28 September 1988. Toronto: The Industrial Development Institute, 1988. Luncheon address.

Toronto, City of. City Council. *By-Law No. 529-88: to Repeal Portions of By-Law Nos. 780-87 and 781-87, Being Interim Control By-Law Respecting Certain Lands Within the Area Known as the Central Waterfront*. Toronto: City of Toronto, 17 June 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *By-Law No. 528-88: to Amend By-Law No. 438-86 Respecting Certain Lands Within the Area Known as the Central Waterfront*. Toronto: City of Toronto, 17 June 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *By-Law No. 527-88: to Adopt an Amendment to the Official Plan for the City of Toronto Respecting the Central Waterfront*. Toronto: City of Toronto, 17 June 1988.

Toronto, City of. City Planning Board, Port Industrial Development Task Force. *Final Report of the Port Industrial Development Task Force*. Toronto: City of Toronto Planning Board, October 1980.

Toronto, City of. City Planning Board, Port Industry Task Force. *Port Industry Task Force*. Toronto: City of Toronto Planning Board, August 1975.

Toronto, City of. Department of the City Clerk. *Clause Embodied in Report No. 14 of the Land Use Committee Which was Amended and Adopted by City Council at its Meeting Held on July 13 and 16, 1987, Report on Development Review and Amendments to Harbour Square, Building Scheme Agreement, 77/79 Harbour Square*. Toronto: City of Toronto Department of the City Clerk, 1987.

Toronto, City of. Planning and Development Department. *The Central Waterfront: Final Recommendations*. Toronto: City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, March 1984.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Central Waterfront: Proposals*. Toronto: City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 24 March 1984.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Harbourfront Review: Opportunities and Objectives": *Report from Commissioner of Planning and Development to City Council Land Use Committee*. Toronto: City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 21 July 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Report to City of Toronto Land Use Committee about Request for Draft By-laws Amending the Official Plan and Zoning By-law for the Central Waterfront*. Toronto: City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 25 April 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Report to Toronto City Council, Reporting on Council's March 21, 1988 Request for Draft By-laws Amending the Official Plan and Zoning By-law for the Central Waterfront*. Toronto: City of Toronto, 9 May 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Report to Toronto City Council, Reporting on Council's March 21, 1988 Request for Draft By-laws Amending the Official Plan and Zoning By-law for the Central Waterfront.* Toronto: City of Toronto, 17 May 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Report to Toronto City Council about Central Waterfront Plan: Issues Raised at Land Use Committee, May 18, 1988.* Toronto: City of Toronto, 10 June 1988.

Toronto Harbour Commissioners, The. *A Bold Concept for the Redevelopment of the Toronto Waterfront.* Toronto: The Toronto Harbour Commissioners, 1968.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Charting a Course for the Future: the Port Industrial Area Concept Plan." *Port of Toronto News* 35, 3 (1988): 5-7.

Toronto Ontario Olympic Council. *Package of Promotional Material for Toronto '96 Olympic Bid: Distributed at Press Conference, February 13, 1989.* Toronto: Toronto Ontario Olympic Council, 1989.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Presentation to the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee.* Toronto: Toronto Ontario Olympic Council, September 1988.

Yalnizyan, Armine. *Missing the Mark: Government Spending on Income Support and Training in Toronto.* Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, April 1988.

\_\_\_\_\_. *A Statistical Profile of Toronto's Labour Market, 1976-87.* Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, May 1988.















(18)

